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ABSTRACT 
This study proposes to examme the significance of trade policy in promoting the 
international competitiveness of South Africalf industry during the period from the early 
1970s up until the present day. By providing a background of South Africa's past trade 
policies, it is argued that the origins of South Africa's low levels of competitiveness 
essentially lie in the apartheid years where trade policies were not linked t6 the attainment of 
international competitiveness and improved productivity. The study then reviews the 
development of South Africa's trade policies in the 1990s. In so doing, it reveals 
weaknesses in the areas of implementation which are critiqued in greater detail by using the 
clothing and textile industries as a case study, and other selected examples. The study finally 
concludes that trade policy is crucial to global competitiveness and that it is the 
responsibility of all parties concerned to ensure that trade policies enhance and not inhibit 
competitiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the democratic elections in April 1994 and the re-entry of South Africa into the 
world market, there has been much concern to 'make up for lost time. South Africa has 
become a participating member of the WTO, it has become a member of the SADC, it is 
busy negotiating a free trade agreement with the EC, a future agreement with NAFT A is 
-- -
being explored, and it is keen to become part of the Indian Ocean Rim initiative. Within the 
country, high on its list of priorities is uplifting the majority of South Africans by creating 
sufficient employment opportunities. The implications of these developments are extensive. 
For in order to cope with an intensely competitive world, one of the major issues that has to 
be addressed is the fact that South African industry is to a large extent internationally 
uncompetitive. 
. This can be directly traced back to apartheid whereby trade policies were not linked 
to the attainment of these goals. Essentially, protection was inefficiently instituted. The 
protective regime was complex and unpredictable, it was biased against exports, there waS 
no drive to increase the level of beneficiation, there was no policy on the duration of 
protection and no performance requirements were imposed on protected industries. As long 
as a producer could supply at least 60 percent of the domestic market, firms were granted 
protection regardless of their competitive potential (Fallon et al, 1994). As a result, firms 
became accustomed to permanent protection where it was more profitable to supply-the 
domestic market than to export. They were thus lulled into a state of policy induced laziness 
. . . 
whereby it was not necessary to produce goods that were internationally competitive. 
With the re-entry of South Africa into the world of international trade, the days of 
lobbying for protection against foreign competition, thereby effectively hiding behind 
protective barriers, have come to an end. The signing of the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994 
heralded a new era where it has become essential to-be internationally competitive !n order 
to survive. The challenges are vast, for as Bell (1990) accurately points out, exposure to 
foreign competition is a double edged sword; it can just as easily kill off certain industries as 
spur them to greater heights of efficiency and competitiveness. It is thus essential that the 
government proceed extremely cautiously when it comes to devising and implementing its 
trade policies. South Africa cannot simply rely on policies that have been successful in other 
countries. Of course, there are some valuable lessons that South Africa can draw from the 
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kept in mind that its situation is to a large extent unique and that the policies that are 
prescribed will work for South Africa, and not prescribed on the basis that they worked for 
other countries. 
Furthermore, there is precious little time for the pursuit of "pie in the sky" ideals. 
The government cannot cast general disper;ions as to how it intends to improve 
competitiveness. It has to be specific as to how this is going to be achieved and importantly, 
it has to do this in conjunction with all affected parties. 
r -
It is in this context that this study proposes to examine the significance of trade 
policy in promoting the international competitiveness of South African industry. This is 
done by examining the impact of past trade policies on the international competitiveness of 
South African industry. The study then reviews the development of South Africa's trade 
policies in the 1990s. In so doing, it reveals weaknesses in the areas of implementation 
which are analyzed in greater detail by using the clothing and textile industries as a case 
study: By critically looking at the literature surrounding the· issues, it is my purpose to 
provide a modest contribution to this ongoing debate. 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides a review .of th~ debates 
surrounding the state, markets and international competitiveness, particularly the role of the 
government and that of the market in achieving international competitiveness. It then 
provides a brief analysis of the changes in the world market that South Africa is re-entering 
and the implications thereof, and within this framework poses the question about the 
centrality of trade policies in. achieving competitiveness. 
Chapter two provides a background of the historical development of South Africa's trade 
policies from the early 1970s up until 1990. It attempts to examine the impact that these 
past trade policies have had on the international competitiveness of South African industry. 
-" 
This is done by using data to analyze the effect- ,that import liberalization and export 
orientated strategies have had on general growth rates and hence the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector. 
Chapter three provides a review of the development of South Africa's trade policies from 
1990 up until the present day. It attempts to show how government has developed its trade 
policies and what measures it has implemented by discussing various key documents. 
3 
Chapter three provides a review of the development of South Afiica's trade policies from 
1990 up until the present day. It attempts to show how government has developed its trade 
policies and what measures it has implemented by discussing various key documents. 
Chapter four provides a critique of policy implementation as well as trade policy in general 
by using the clothing and textile industries as a case study. In discussing how 
implementation has taken place within these industries, various issues of contention with 
regards to implementation are mentioned. These are then analyzed in greater detail and in so 
doing, the impact that present government policy is likely to have on the international 
competitiveness of South Afiican industry is discussed. 
Chapter five summarizes the arguments and then draws them together into some final 
concluding remarks. 
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Chapter One 
The State, the Market and International Competitiveness: A Review 
1.1. Introduction 
~< 
Although the central concern of international competitiveness is international trade, 
the concept has far deeper ramifications than the simple perception that it is merely a 
measure of a country's ability to sell abroad and to maintain a trade equilibrium. According 
r - ~ 
to ul Haque (1994) and Cohen (1994), international competitiveness is essentially a measure 
of a country's capacity to maintain and increase its living standards, to expand its 
employment opportunities and to be able to maintain its international obligations, without 
running into balance of payments problems. Simultaneously, international competitiveness is 
about making sure that the same policies that may limit balance of payment problems do not 
have adverse effects on the domestic front. Devaluation and deflation, for example, are 
common policies used to stimulate exports and close trade deficits. At the same time, 
however, they also involve a reduction in domestic income, an effect which would not 
-- -:.;"..-
contribute towards either the maintenance or increase of a country's standards ofliving. 
International competitiveness is based on superior productivity performance and a 
country's ability to move production towards higher productivity activities which in tum can 
generate high levels of real wages. A good example of this is the current pattern of intra-
industry trade, whereby countries are increasingly moving towards production in higher 
productivity sectors, such as highly advanced manufactured goods like machinery, 
pharmaceuticals and instruments~ t~e sectors in which growth, efficiency and hence 
productivity are the greatest. According to Lawrence (1993: 4), these are precisely the types 
of products in which industrial country exports have increased most rapidly. In fact, trade in 
manufactured goods has outpaced trade in primary commodities, with trade in the most 
advanced products having increased even more rapidly. This is also not only a trend that is 
-' 
exclusive to the developed world, for over the pasi two decades, trade in manufactured 
goods has become increasingly important for developing countries, particularly countries in 
Asia and Latin America. 
Consequently, the types of products that a country produces impact on the growth of 
the standards of living. The higher the degree of specialization in high productivity 
products like pharmaceuticals, machinery and instruments, the higher the increases in 
standards of living will be. 
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Merely using the existing productive capabilities, however, is not enough. The newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) are a good example in this case, for they strove to become 
internationally competitive in new lines of production, by using the capabilities they had 
developed in the early phase of their import substitution stage. In so doing, they managed to 
create comparative advantage in new areas, by' constantly introducing new and improved 
products and more efficient processing techniques. Policies which are not focused to some 
degree on this type of strategy, face the risk of a declining income rate due to a loss of 
market share to more competitive countries (ul Haque, 1994). 
It then follows that competitiveness requires substantial investment in the necessary 
technology and skills in order to maintain the continual improvement and innovation in 
existing industries and the capacity to compete successfully in new industries. This is 
concurrent with the growth in manufactured trade, where it has increasingly become 
technology and skills that give a country a competitive edge in the international economy 
rather than natural resources and raw labour, experience has demonstrated that resources 
need to be extracted efficiently and that they need to be beneficiated. In today's global 
~ 
economy, countries with a poorly educated and trained work force and inadequate access to 
technology will not become competitive. 
It is in this context that the controversy has revolved around the question, what tools 
are able to achieve international competitiveness. There are those who assert that the 
market is the ultimate tool in attaining international competitiveness, while others advocate a 
far greater degree of government involvement in the attainment of this goal. 
The next section goes on ~o discuss these two approaches to international trade. 
1.2. The N eo-Classical Approach 
The current and most dominant approach to international trade is the neo-classical 
approach which is part of mainstream, traditional economic theory. It has its roots in the 
-' 
classical free trade theories which were proposed from the end of the eighteenth c~ntury, in 
reaction to mercantilism, by the likes of Adam Smith and David Ricardo who essentially 
argued that countries should concentrate on producing those goods for which its resources 
are most suited, implying those activities in which its costs are relatively cheapest. 
Accordingly, by exchanging these goods, all trading countries would benefit as, by using 
their productive capabilities to the highest efficiency, this would increase their combined 
output and raise their general living standards. 
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Their emphasis was thus on the gains from trade. Trade, it was argued, resulted in 
an increased international specialization of production and a division of labour. To this 
effect, the labour theory of value was developed, the notion that all costs can ultimately be 
reduced to units of labour, which in tum are directly related to the prices that must be 
charged for the products (Berry et al. 1993).< . 
Classical theory continued to be refined throughout the nineteenth century and 
during the early years of the twentieth century. It was in 1933 that neo-classical theory 
began to take form, when Bertil Ohlin extended the earlier ideas of rEli -Heckscher by 
replacing the classical labour theory of value with a new theory acknowledging the effects, 
not only of labour, but also the other factors of production, namely, land, capital and 
management - the Heckscher-Olin Model. Because countries differ in their factor 
endowments and their factor intensities, each country will export those goods whose 
production is relatively intensive in the country's abundant factor and import those that are 
intensive in the factors it lacks. Subsequent authors have continued to refine neo-classical 
economics, but they all still fall within the realms of traditional theory. What then according 
to the neo-classical approach determines international competitiveness? 
If competitiveness depends on the types of products produced and traded, the logical 
question that arises from this is, what determines international specialization in production? 
According to the neo-classical approach, international specialization is based on the 
assumption that a country's relative factor endowments determines its comparative 
advantage, and that the market can generally be relied upon to be efficient in its allocation of 
. -- - . 
the factors of production, as well as to determine the optimal pattern of product 
specialization (ul Haque, 1994). Consequently, it is held that any form of state intervention 
is unnecessary, and could even be harmful. 
It is, however, recognized that free markets are not always optimal and, therefore, 
the concept of market failure is conceded. The presence of externalities, public goods, 
increasing returns to scale, imperfect information, :few' buyers or sellers, are all instances 
which can lead to market failures, resulting in allocative inefficiencies and unemployment. 
The onus thus falls on the government to repair market failures. 
Nonetheless, a distinction is made between acceptable and unacceptable areas for 
government intervention. Wade (1990) notes the essential economic functions of the state 
according to neo-classical economics: 
• To maintain macro-economic stability; 
• to provide physical infrastructure; 
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• to supply "public goods", such as defense and national security, education and the legal 
system; 
• to contribute to the development of institutions for improving the markets such as for 
finance and labour; 
• to eliminate price distortions which arise in ~ases of demonstrable market failure; and 
• to redistribute income to the poorest, in sufficient measures for them to meet basic needs. 
But more importantly, it is held that the government should desist from lfecoming an active 
player and should confine "itself to intervention that guarantees the framework of rules for 
the market order" and remove the "obstacles to competition and the free play of market 
forces" (Jones, 1983:69). 
It is evident that neo-classical economics is committed to the primacy of economics 
over the government, as well as to the view that the market and the price mechanism are the 
most efficient means for organizing domestic and international economic relations. 
Consequently, it advocates export-orientated trade strategies with the emphasis on 
comparative advantage. 
1.3. Statism 
The fact that no country in the world today actually fulfills the theoretical 
postulations of market theory, indicates that neo-classical economics does not provide an 
adequate explanation for international trade. In an economic world order which is 
characterized by countries at varying stages of economic development, with some having 
distinct advantages and eventualiy becoming more efficient and intef]1ationally competitive 
than others, the lesser developed of these countries are put under increasing competitive 
pressures as they become more exposed to the world economy. The major impetus for 
protection is thus a country intent on improving the position of its domestic producers 
relative to foreign pfoducers (Frieden, 1991), who will undoubtedly engage in some forms of 
protectionism. As it is naturally the objective of every country to pursue economic policies 
that promote national economic growth and development, where it is perceived that the 
market is failing to achieve or further a country's national goals, the state is expected to 
intervene. 
In addition, as a result of the Keynesian revolution, government's role in maintaining 
employment and creating an environment where living standards can rise, has a wide 
following. The neo-classical model is thus no longer seen as infallible. This, however, does 
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not mean that just because the neo-classical prescription is not completely accepted, that the 
market is necessarily rejected. In fact the debate has in recent times transcended this issue 
and recent controversy is precisely about what kind of balance should be struck between 
"how much" government and "how much" market. 
Today, the importance of macro-economic policy and the need for policy 
intervention to support macro policy is not contended. The debate concerns the 
effectiveness of government policy and identifying the sources of market failure that might 
r -
require some form of government intervention. Although traditional theory concedes 
demonstrable cases of market failure which may call for some form of government 
intervention, there are areas where the government's role has been said to be more 
"ambiguous" and "controversial" (ul Harque, 1994), but which still demonstrates the need 
for intervention. 
The government's role with regards to national interest is one such area. Take the 
example of the opening up of trade between the USA and Mexico which has resulted in 
Mexico's wages rising and the USA's wages falling, and hence its employment and living 
standards. Another example is the situation of the former Soviet Union where, as a result of 
the opening up of world trade, output and employment have fallen drastic,ally. In 
circumstances such as these, where a country's employment and living standards are 
threatened, the argument that the market is allocating resources efficiently and that all that is 
needed is for them to move to higher productivity jobs, is not likely to be very persuasive. 
In such cases, the government clearly has a role in facilitating the re-allocation of 1!l90ur 
through macro-economic policy as well as specific actions at the sectoral level. State 
intervention may also be necessary in order to redress the balance where some are able to 
take better advantage of the market, than others. 
The development of technology is another such area. Progress in technology is 
crucial with regards to an economy's capacity to grow and compete internationally. A major 
determinant of progress in technology is the effort put into Research and Development 
(R&D) (ul Harque, 1994). According to Nelson (1981), because the outcome of R&D is 
characterized by an intrinsic uncertainty together with the general proprietary nature of 
technical knowledge, this represents a case of market failure. Factors contributing to this 
conclusion are numerous. Technology is not a product that can be bought and sold as such, 
for the cost of acquiring it and its effectiveness varies enormously among firms. 
Additionally, the market cannot be relied upon to allocate resources to R&D, due to firms 
lacking the incentive to innovate, as well as being deterred by the knowledge that others can 
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easily imitate them. The result is that the market causes either too much or too little to be 
spent on R&D, making it extremely difficult for the right balance to be struck. Although 
there is no guarantee that the government can do any better, government support of R&D is 
extremely prevalent. The government also has an important role in building the nation's 
ability to develop and use 
-~ .. 
Another area is that of the development of the non-tradable sector. This includes 
technological knowledge. labour, infrastructure and public administration, the efficiency of 
which is essential to international competitiveness. The NICs, for example, are well known 
for their superior quality in labour and infrastructure, which are the result of efficient civil 
services in successfully dealing with the problems of information, administrative capability, 
transparency, accountability and impartiality (Stern, 1989). The inclusion of public 
administration is thus significant, for its effectiveness largely determines the success of 
government intervention. 
This brings me to perhaps the most important factor With regards to government 
intervention, namely that it is not necessarily good or bad trade policies that determine 
- -
economic success, but the efficiency of the government in implementing them. As Lall 
(1993: 59) appropriately argues: 
"The government itself is the most important 'institution' in the development process. 
Its ability to design and implement policies is what detennines industrial 
competitiveness, and the best set of policies is not that of a 'minimalist state' which 
provides law, order and defense and leaves the rest to (perfectly functioning) 
markets". 
Take the case of the NICs which currently rank amongst the world's top exporting 
countries. It is generally conceded that their outward trade orientation contributed towards 
their spectacular performance, but more significant than the actual policy orientation, is the 
fact that this success was attained despite extensive government intervention. Furthermore, 
although the NICs s)Vitched to an export-led path of industrialization, this in not to say that 
import substitution came to a halt. In Taiwan and South Korea, for example, import 
substitution and export promotion took place simultaneously (Wade, 1990). 
Another neo-classical assumption that the NICs challenged was the static notion of 
comparative advantage, namely that each country should specialize in those areas where it 
has the most natural advantages and import those goods that can be bought more efficiently 
from abroad. These countries, although agreeing with the fundamental principles of 
comparative advantage, demonstrated that comparative advantage was a dynamic concept 
which could be created, a notion which has generally gained wide recognition over the years. 
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Take Japan for example, who had a comparative disadvantage in precision machinery in 
1967. According to neo-c1assical theory, Japan should have opened its borders and allowed 
foreign competition to wipe out this industry on their way to delivering cheaper products to 
Japanese consumers. Instead, precision machinery and other industries were protected until 
they had surpassed their US counterparts (Finance Week, January 14-20, 1993). 
The answer, thus, lies in the effectiveness of state intervention. The NICs had 
governments who were highly effective in carrying out government policy. Amsden (1992), 
points out the essential difference between governments that are effective in carrying out 
government policy, and those that are not. Accordingly, effectiveness does not rely on 
whether subsidies are or not given, for all governments do this. Rather, effectiveness 
depends on the principles that govern the allocation of subsidies. Countries that have not 
made the transition from import substitution to export-orientated growth, have failed for a 
very specific reason, namely that no performance standards have been imposed upon the 
recipients of subsidies. If there is no discipline, then the industries receiving them are 
unlikely to become internationally efficient, productive, and hence competitive. The same 
argument applies to export subsidies. 
Countries that have successfully made the transition to outward-orientate.dgrowth 
have disciplined subsidy recipients. According to Amsden, the differences in rates of growth 
and productivity among late-industrializing countries depends on the degree to which 
countries are willing and able to discipline capital. The NICs have demonstrated this 
willingness and attained this ability, while many of the countries who have not mag~ the 
transition from import substitution to export-orientated growth, particularly the less 
developed countries, have not. 
The same principal can be applied in the case of industrial policy, whereby certain 
industries are selectively promoted. Although it is now generally accepted that industry is the 
basis of economic prosperity, and that all governments have policies that regulate and 
.. 
provide incentives to industries, there is little consensus on whether the government should 
intervene on a strategic basis. Many argue that governments do not have the ability or 
knowledge for making economically rational strategic choices. This probably explains why 
strategic industrial policy has been such a failure in many countries. It does not, however, 
explain why it has been such a resounding success in others, particularly the NICs. Contrary 
to what many believe, the formation of their industrial policies was not made by government 
bureaucrats making arbitrary decisions without regard to market signals, rather, it was a 
consultative process involving all affected parties (VI Haque, 1994). What it demonstrated 
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was that the government does have an essential role in forming an environment conducive to 
the creation of "winning" industries. 
This leads on to another important point, that of the interaction between government 
and business. Various models of this interaction exist, the differences of which do not lie in 
the extent of government intervention, but ratHer in the nature of the relationship between 
the two. The economic success of countries like Taiwan and Japan, for example, is due to 
the close and complementary relationship between business and government, a lesson which 
most countries would be advised to take heed of 
Consequently, the combination of Keynesian and Statist arguments lead to very 
different trade strategies than those prescribed by mainstream, traditional theory, namely 
import substitution and extensive government intervention in the operations ofthe market. 
This debate demonstrates that competitiveness does not only depend on the market. 
The next section therefore discusses the trade strategies that have historically 
reflected these different theoretical approaches. 
1.4. Trade Strategies 
Weiss (1988), appropriately sums up the traditional distinction between,the two 
main trade strategies that dominate the literature. Inward orientated policies which aimed at 
meeting the demands of the domestic market, and outward orientated policies which do not 
necessarily discriminate against the domestic market and often encourages exports. 
Accordingly, the general trade strategy pursued by inward orientated economies is i:nPort 
substitution, while export-led industrialization is the trade strategy pursued by outward 
orientated economies. Both of these have played their roles in history .. 
Between 1815 and 1914 the economic system became characterized by export-led 
growth and market orientated policies. Despite this, it was mixed and sometimes dominated 
by fairly extensive protection, with protection of the import-competing sector becoming a 
feature of the industrialization process of many countries such as the USA, Japan, Austria, 
Hungary, Italy and most of the developing countries. 
With the economic effects of the Great Depression in 1929, a general pessimism 
developed with regard to the power of trade in promoting rapid economic growth. In a 
world economy where there was a marked slackening in the expansion of world trade, and 
where a number of countries had demonstrated that import substitution was a feasible trade 
strategy, the option of export expansion became increasingly limited. The onset of World 
War 2 and the consequent economic effects thereof simply reinforced these sentiments with 
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the government being assigned a substantial role in repairing market failure (Wade, 1990). 
For the less developed countries which had not "taken off' in the way countries like the 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Sweden had, an even larger role for the 
state was required. This led to the import substitution strategy of economic development 
becoming the dominant trade strategy, the basic rationale being that in order for countries to 
metamorphose from a stagnant economy to a growing one, protection was necessary in 
order to give them the chance to mature to the point where they could satisfactorily compete 
in world markets. 
When import substitution was initially established the results of the first stage, 
involving the production of non-durable consumer goods characterized by intensive 
unskilled labour, unsophisticated technology and so on, appeared promising. However, by 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, difficulties experienced in import substitution led to a policy 
divergence: 
• Import substitution resulted in inefficient and uncompetitive industries; 
• rent seeking began to divert energies away from actual Prodllction; 
• resources were inefficiently allocated; 
• employment and income distribution worsened; 
• exports were detrimentally penalized; 
• too many plants produced too small an output; 
• quality was inferior; 
• capital was underutilized; 
• an increasingly monopolistic or oligopolistic industrial structure developed; 
• there was a general failure to develop manufactured exports; and 
• increasingly stringent exchange control regimes developed. Wade (1990) ,Williamson et 
al. 
(1991) and Fallon et al. (1994) 
In general, import substitution was not targeted according to systematic economic 
criteria, but instead was pursued in a chaotic, inefficient manner and for too long a time 
(Meier, 1990). Import substitution ordinarily meant high-cost production for limited 
national markets, leading to inflation and representing a continual drain on economies. 
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Local markets became saturated and opportunities for further import substitution became 
exhausted. Only those less developed countries with very large domestic markets like 
Mexico, Taiwan the Philippines and Brazil have had some success with import substitution 
and even these countries have had to find new strategies for further growth. 
Despite this, in the early 1960s many· less developed countries like India, South 
Africa and most of Latin America went on to the second stage of import substitution, 
involving the production of more durable consumer goods. For countries with little 
industrial expertise, the production techniques of capital intensive and some intermediate 
goods was not as suitable as for the production of non-durable consumer goods, and 
furthermore it entailed production that was increasingly high cost, the decrease in the rate of 
growth in aggregate output, and lagging employment as further import substitution became 
more difficult (Meier, 1990). Other countries, however, in particular, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Korea and Singapore, broke away from import substitution and adopted outward orientated 
trade strategies. 
Against this background, the next section examines import substitution and export-
led industrialization in greater detail. 
1.4.1. Import Substitution 
Import substitution is the process whereby resources are allocated away from 
production for exports toward production for the domestic market, in the attempt to 
promote domestic industrialization. The aim is thus to displace imports by producinK tpose 
goods locally, which is done by employing protection measures such as import tariffs, 
restrictions on imports and controls on access to foreign exchange (Weiss, 1988). This has 
the effect of protecting domestic producers from foreign competition and cheapening 
imported capital goods for production in the domestic market by an over valued exchange 
rate. 
.. 
Import substitution has been justified for a number of reasons. One explanation is 
export pessimism. Because of the low price and income elasticities of demand for the 
primary products produced by most less developed countries, export revenue grows very 
slowly. If industrialization is then to proceed, it should be on the basis of producing for the 
home market. Related to this is the perception that it is easier to save foreign exchange 
through import substitution rather than to earn it by exporting manufactured goods. 
The existence of externalities is another rationale. They can arise in a number of 
ways, such as in the case where an industry invests in the improvement of worker 
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productivity. If the industry wants to reap the benefits of having better qualified workers, it 
has to take into account that the worker may leave. If this happens, the industry will be left 
bearing the costs and will in future not invest in the improvement of the skills of its workers. 
Protection, it is argued, will encourage the industry to expand production and expenditure 
(Grabowski, 1994). -~ .. 
Perhaps the most cornmon justification is the infant industry argument. If a new 
industry has the potential to compete at international standards, but is vulnerable in its initial 
r~ -
phases due to high start-up costs and operating inefficiencies, it will not be able to compete 
with established foreign industries, without some measure of protection. Protection can then 
be withdrawn after its initial start-up phase which has given the industry enough time to 
establish itself. This argument is only valid for the less developed countries, and even then, 
the industry must really have the potential to become self-sustaining and not, as happens 
more often than not, corne to rely on state subsidies. 
1.4.2. Export-Led Industrialization 
As opposed to import substitution, which is orientated';' toward the domestic market 
and whose activities are predominantly determined by government decisions, an 94tWard-
orientated export-led trade strategy is geared toward the international market. This, 
however, does not mean that an outward orientated trade strategy is not influenced by 
government decisions. 
Although an outward orientated trade strategy appears to indicate a preferen'2~ for 
foreign markets, this is not the case. Rather, what is stressed is that price incentives are set in 
such a manner so as to ensure that production for the domestic market does not become 
more lucrative than production for foreign markets (Bhagwati, 1988). Such a trade regime 
thus works at reducing the bias against exports, so that the relative incentives for horne and 
export sales are neutral. 
.. 
The benefit~ of export promotion are thought to be both numerous and widespread. 
The static, efficiency arguments for an export promotion strategy imply that once a country 
follows such a strategy there will be one-time overall gains in efficiency and do not imply 
that the rate of growth can be raised by following such a strategy (Grabowski, 1994). One 
such argument is the increased efficiency of the allocation of resources according to a 
country's comparative advantage in international trade, which will effectively raise a 
country's income. Another gain it is argued, is the realization of economies of scale. This 
argument is justified on the grounds that for firms to achieve optimal scale, they must 
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produce for sale for foreign markets in order to achieve increasing returns and hence optimal 
scale. Domestic markets, it is argued, are simply not big enough for firms to achieve this. 
There are also some additional gains which are considered more dynamic by nature 
and which actually raise the rate of growth. Lal and Rajapatirana (1987) argue that the key 
to rapid growth is the entrepreneur. In an import substitution environment where 
governments are free to use policies that can distort the domestic economy in order to 
guarantee that the domestic market is available for domestic producers, entrepreneurial 
~- -
activities become limited. They argue that an outward orientated trade strategy is more 
conducive for entrepreneurial activity, as greater opportunities and rewards are produced as 
well as limiting the options of governments. The effect of more intensive entrepreneurial 
activity is then higher growth. 
Another dynamic effect relates to a country's importing capabilities. It is without 
question that most developing countries are unable to produce today's sophisticated capital 
equipment and will thus have to rely on importing such equipment. The rates at which new 
technology can be applied, however, depends on the ability to import, which in tum depends 
on how much foreign exchange a country has in order be able to import the goods. The 
faster exports grow, the greater will be the foreign exchange generated to pay for the 
imports and as the rate of technical innovation increases, the more likely the overall growth 
rate is to increase. 
Today, it is generally recognized that the gains associated with export promotion are 
far superior to those associated with import substitution. This, however, does- not 
necessarily mean that protectionist I11easures should be discouraged. On the contrary, I 
would assert that there are many countries in dire need of these measures, but they need 
governments that are highly effective in carrying out policies. Unfortunately, more often 
than not, these policies are nor pursued according to systematic economic criteria, thus 
leading to inefficiency. Additionally, these policies, instead of being seen as temporary 
.. 
measures, become permanent fixtures. 
Although the attainment of international competitiveness largely depends on effective 
implementation of trade policies, another significant influence is the importance of 
participating in the changing nature of the global arena of trade and the demands it imposes 
on participating countries. This next section analyzes how the changing world economy is 
likely to impact on South Africa's quest for global competitiveness. 
1.5. The Centrality of International Trade 
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One major lesson that has been learnt over the last 40 years is that increased 
participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic growth and prosperity. 
Since 1950 there has been a close correlation between a country's domestic performance and 
its participation in the world economy (Drucker, 1994). This correlation is seen in countries 
like Japan and South Korea who have grown the fastest in the world economy and whose 
domestic economies have also grown the fastest. However, countries like Great Britain 
have retreated from the world economy with domestic economies that have consistently 
~~ -
declined. There are also those countries like France and the USA who have maintained their 
participation rate in the world economy within a fairly narrow range, and whose domestic 
economies have performed neither exceptionally nor persistently badly as Great Britain. In 
fact, according to Drucker (1994), the evidence of the last 40 years convincingly 
demonstrates that participation in the world economy has become the controlling factor in 
the domestic economic performance of developed countries. 
In a recent World Bank study of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, two common economic policies surfaced 
-- ~ 
(Drucker, 1994: 106). Firstly, these countries did not try to control the economic weather. 
Instead, they focused on creating the right economic climate. Secondly, it was found that 
these countries adopted policies that would reinforce the competitiveness of their industries 
in the world economy, paying only secondary attention to the domestic effects. 
South Africa has a small economy, relatively speaking, and does not amount to much 
III world trade as its share therein is relatively small. Today it is internati..on~ly 
uncompetitive in many sectors. To oyercome its many limitations, it is crucial that the South 
Africa economy becomes fully integrated into the global community. ' 
It is through international trade that countries earn necessary foreign exchange. 
However, for a country like South Africa, whose productivity levels are far behind those in 
developed countries~ it is also a crucially important source of know-how, for it is only by 
competing in global markets or with open domestic 'markets that countries can be sure that 
their products meet world class standards (Lawrence, 1993). It is thus very important for 
South Africa to subscribe to the current tendencies in world trade, as they not only act as 
indicators of what can be learned from the experiences of other countries, but they also 
enhance the importance of South Africa's trade policies corresponding with the current 
world trading environment. 
However, for South Africa to be able to do this, it has to have a sound understanding 
of the traits, dynamics and implications of global developments and an awareness of the 
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realities and challenges facing the economy. As Scott (1995:200) states, "It will require 
realism, good planning and sound management of the country's reintegration into the global 
economy" . F or South Africa, the challenge is vast, as it is years since it has participated as 
a full member of the global community. Furthermore, South Africa's emergence has 
coincided with the unfolding of a new world order. So it is imperative that South Africa 
find a place for itself in the new world order. 
In the next section, we examine in brief terms some of the important changes the 
world market has experienced, changes crucial to South Africa's global competitiveness. 
1.6. Trends in International Trade and their Implications for South Africa 
It is without question that the world economy has become increasingly integrated. 
Extraordinary advances have been made in transport, electronics and communications 
technology coupled with the trend towards deregulation and the lowering of barriers 
between national markets for production factors, and goods, which has resulted in a 
dramatic increase in trade especially between industrial countries. As a result of these 
advances, many of the obstacles which previously affected the location of production 
facilities, have been removed. The Global Economic Village has become a reality .. " 
Production factors, notably the capital components have become tentacles in their 
quest for the most lucrative opportunities. Indeed, foreign investment abroad has grown 
dramatically and there is intense competition between countries to establish the most 
conducive conditions. Countries who are not competitive producers of goods and servlGes, 
and who have not created ~ emjronment receptive to international business, have no hope 
in this competitive game. Traditional foreign investment, however; is rapidly shifting to 
alliances such as joint ventures, partnerships, knowledge agreements and outsourcing 
arrangements (Drucker, 1994). In fact formal and informal alliances are becoming the 
dominant form of ec_~momic integration in the world economy. The implications are vast, for 
although alliances increasingly generate both trade' and investment, these are secondary. 
Instead they are based on the sharing of knowledge. 
It is perhaps surprising that the concept of pooled knowledge has only recently come 
to the fore in such a large way. It all comes down to an increasingly competitive world. The 
speed in bringing new products to the world market has become a competitive race, critically 
important to competitive success. With increasingly complex and costly research and 
development, what better way to overcome this than by pooling knowledge. An increasing 
number of businesses are discovering that they can no longer produce technology and 
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growth internally and are increasingly looking outside for strategic assets, and thus the trend 
for the formation of transnational alliances., to develop and market new products. 
Some examples are the alliances between many university research labs and 
businesses. Then there are alliances in which organizations out source support activities by 
letting independent suppliers do their data proeessing, maintenance and so on. An example 
of this shift to alliances is that of Intel., a US based microchip designer and Sharp, the 
electronics manufacturer who decided to divide the design and production of an advanced 
microchip between them resulting in both Intel and Sharp sharing the -final product. 
According to Drucker (1994: 103): 
"Integration in the Common Market is proceeding far more through alliances than 
through mergers and acquisitions, especially among the middle-sized companies that 
dominate most European economies". 
Although alliances have become an important element of international trade, this 
does not imply that foreign investment no longer plays an important role. On the contrary, 
the period from 1985 to 1990 was marked by massive increases in foreign investment which 
grew three times as rapidly as the pace of world exports ¥ld the rate of world GDP. 
Although the annual global direct investment flow decreased in 1992, it recovered in 1993 
and basically maintained an ongoing recovery trend in 1994, though the- recovery rate 
slightly slowed (Jetro White Paper, 1996). 
Foreign investment has been gro'wing particularly rapidly in services, representing 
close to 50 percent of the total world stock of foreign investment by the late 1980s. This 
can be understood by the developments in information technologies, which have increased 
global integration in many service sectors that were once isolated. Additionally, the trend 
towards financial liberalization, privatization and deregulation has created investment 
opportunities in service sectors such as banking, communications, utilities and transportation 
in which investment opportunities were once limited. 
For South Africa, the challenges are vast, for it needs sustainable higher levels of 
-
economic growth in order to grow. Attracting inflows of capital is an important way of 
doing so, especially in the form of equity and direct investment, for this is the type of capital 
that builds factories, thus leading to increased employment and increased exports. 
Furthermore, foreign investment also means securing access to essential technology, and 
facilitating the development and accumulation of skills in the local economy. The latter is 
significant for it is important for the South Afiican economy not to become to reliant on 
foreign technology. 
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However, due to the intense competition for these limited resources, South Africa 
will have to attract foreign investors by being a competitive producer of goods and services 
and by creating an environment hospitable to business, thereby becoming an investor-friendly 
country. This is no easy task, for according to Scott (1995), for South Africa to be a serious 
contender for international investment, it will have to reconcile domestic political and social 
agendas with the realities of international competitiveness. Scott goes on to argue that 
social objectives cannot be allowed to overshadow economic business realities if the country 
is serious about attracting foreign resources. The government, the trade unions and the 
business sector all have a part to play in attracting much needed foreign investment. 
At present there is some foreign interest in South Africa. By the end of 1995, 
R8.5bn was committed by foreign firms in investment money (Weekly Mail & Guardian, 
December 8, 1995). Although these figures are based on press reports, they are nevertheless 
indicative of a trend. Significant investments, for example, have been made by the Malaysian 
group Samrand, which has invested Rl billion in property and banking, Renong which is 
building a R201 million Hilton Hotel in Durban and is planning a Rl billion development at 
the Durban Point, and the Business Focus Group which- istreveloping the R220 million 
Hilton Hotel in Sandton (Financial Mail, August 2, 1996, Internet). Recently, Malaysia has 
also injected R1.88 billion into Engen. In fact, the conservative estimate of the value of 
Malaysian investment in South Africa is around R5 billion. 
The number of firms from the US coming back to South Africa is also on the rise. 
From 280 firms in 1985, this figure had dropped to 104 in 1991 and rose to 235 in 1995. 
Additionally, over 12 US firms invested over R200 million each in 1995 (Weekly Mail and 
Guardian, December 8, 199-5). 
However, despite this trend, relative to the size of the economy, foreign investment 
IS still small and is not yet being converted into the type of large-scale, long-term 
investments that will expand the economy's productive capacity that creates jobs and wealth. 
According to Soudi Africa's Mercedes-Benz chairperson, this is likely to continue, for 
foreign investors and governments are fast losing patience with South Africa's lack of 
urgency in implementing investor-friendly economic policies (Weekly Mail & Guardian, June 
7, 1996). In particular, labour disruptions and pay demands are serious reasons why South 
Africa is not seeing this type of investment. Labour costs are a fraction of what they are in 
South Africa compared to countries like Indonesia. In this scenario, foreign investors are far 
more likely to go to these countries as opposed to South Africa. 
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In a world which is as competitive as it is fast-moving, it is necessary for South 
Africa to make the most of the current foreign interest. However, it is just as important for 
the government, the trade unions and the business sector to reach a mutual understanding on 
the issue. Without that the economy would soon collapse. As labour costs are not going to 
change, it appears than that South Africa is' not going to see much of the employment 
creating investment. Instead, the type of investment that is likely to continue to 
predominate, are foreign firms opening up branch offices through assuming direct control of 
distributorship or through non-equity ties such as licensing and distribution agreements, 
foreign investors investing in South Africa companies (by far the largest type of investment 
at R4.5bn in 1995), foreign aid, soft loan funding and commercial lending. 
Despite an integrated world economy, one contradictory consequence of this is the 
pattern of regional integration as the world has moved towards the formation of competing 
regional trade blocs. The impetus originates from the breakdown of the philosophical barrier 
between the market-orientated industrialized world and the state control-orientated Third 
World, and the military and ideological barrier symbolized by the Iron Curtain in Europe 
(Hormats, 1994). Both have artificially obstructed trade -and investment among regional 
neighbours for decades. The removal of these barriers has allowed geography to-playa 
decisive role in determining trade and investment. 
The new order thus appears to be evolving along two broad tracks. The one will 
emphasize regional negotiations between newly market-orientated economies as well as 
between them and industrialized market economies, while the other will consist of ensuring 
the cooperation that will be required to ensure the consistency between global and regional 
trade expansion (Hormats, 1994). 
Elements of threat and opportunity are inherent in the trend towards the formation of 
regional blocs. Regional free trade agreements can improve resource allocation by enlarging 
markets, expanding investment flows and creating economies of scale. They can also result 
.. 
in a further lowering of trade barriers and can improve cooperation on domestic policies. 
On the other hand, there is the fear that regional blocs could tum inward and erect 
protectionist barriers that would not only harm outsiders, but would also cripple the 
potential growth of the world economy. Although Asia, more than any other part of the 
world, has practiced open regionalism, with the majority of regions being partly closed, it is 
unlikely that there will be a shift towards closed blocs. Although countries may benefit from 
regional arrangements, extra-regional trade is simply too important to sever trade ties with 
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the rest of the world. To date, the fears that regionalism will derail globalism appear to have 
been overcome. 
By the end of 1994, at least 100 regional trade groupings were in existence. In fact, 
about 60 percent of world trade currently takes place within free trade agreements or among 
countries that have decided to achieve free' trade by a certain date (Bergsten, 1996). 
Examples are the North American Free Trade Area (NAFT A), Mercosur in Latin America, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APE C), the Association of South East Asian 
r- -
Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), an EU agreement with 12 Mediterranean 
countries to establish free trade by 2010 (Euromed), the prospective Free Trade Area of the 
Americas devised by the 34 democracies of the western hemisphere (FT AA), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the prospective Indian Ocean Rim trade bloc, 
and many more. 
In order for countries to secure a solid position in the world economy, it is crucial 
that they cultivate links with the emerging major trading blocs. Additionally it is just as 
important for countries to develop intra-regional trade links in their own part of the world. 
For South Africa who is not a member of a strong or~potentially important trading 
bloc, it is essential that it forge bi-Iateral and/or multi-lateral links with all the majorgIobal 
trading blocs in order to be able to win export concessions in exchange for favoured access 
to a large market. These are the European Community, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and South America, and the emerging Asian trading area. Additionally, it is 
important that South Africa focus on its own region. This includes Southern, Equatoril!lJUld 
North Africa, and the Indian Ocean basin countries. South Africa's agenda should also 
include the reforming command economies of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and 
China, and then the Middle East. 
The EU has been South Africa's major market for the past few decades. More than 
half of South Africa's total exports are directed towards the EC, with a similar proportion of 
its imports coming from the area. It is thus important for South Africa to neg?tiate a 
favourable trade deal with the EU, as according to Elty Links, the new ambassador to the 
EU, "Securing worthwhile access to EU markets could lead to economic growth at home" 
(Financial Mail, July 19, 1996, Internet). 
South Africa was unsuccessful in the bid to get preferential treatment in terms of the 
Lome Convention, a trade agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. Instead, the EU proposed a bilateral Free Trade Agreement. 
Negotiations between the EU and South Africa regarding the conclusion of the Free trade 
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Agreement were resumed this year after an eight month break, during which time South 
Africa drew up its negotiating mandate. The negotiations pertain to a two-part deal giving 
South Africa immediate access to the European market while allowing a ten year phase-in 
period for reciprocal treatment, and providing South Africa with limited membership of the 
Lome Convention. However, the EU's staIfce in trade negotiations has proved to be 
disappointing with their opening negotiation mandate not living up to South Africa's 
expectations or their original promises. At best it has offered a decidedly limited free trade 
deal, which has been rejected as one-sided by South African business. r·-
The official feeling from Pretoria is that the EU's exclusion of almost 39 percent of 
South Africa's farm exports, including zero-trade items, on a list on which import duties will 
be levied for up to twelve years (Financial Mail, June 7, 1996) from the free trade accord is 
unacceptable and that it fails to address the concerns of SACU who greatly fear losing 
revenue from the Southern African customs union pool, which will certainly be affected by 
the reduction of tariffs for the ED. Thabo Mbeki, however, returned from his eight-nation 
European tour confident that the EU would back down from its position with regard to 
South Africa's farm exports, particularly in light of the facCcertaln EU members like the UK 
and Sweden are adamantly opposed to the EU's "blocking" mandate. 
At this point, serious negotiations to conclude the trade deal are scheduled to start in 
the new year. 
Although only 12 percent of South Africa's total exports by value go to the SADC 
countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mauritius), over 30 percent of its total manufactured 
exports by value go to these countries. This implies that South Africa:s trade with Southern 
Africa is particularly important, with many South African manufacturers exporting only to 
the African market. However, the GNU envisions something far more than simply ensuring 
the continuation of advantageous trade with Southern Africa. According to an electronic 
document concerning South Africa and the SAD.C. (1996), the GNU's vision for the 
Southern African region, "is one of the highest possible degree of economic co-operation, 
mutual assistance where necessary and joint planning consistent with socio-economic, 
environmental and political realities. South Africa strives to achieve regional economic 
development by using the SADC". This vision corresponds with the aims of the SADC, 
namely to provide for regional peace and security, sector cooperation and an integrated 
regional economy. 
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South Mrica demonstrated its commitment to the aims of the SADC by acceding to the 
SADC Treaty on the 3 August 1994 and becoming the organization's financial and 
investment sector coordinator. 
At the SADC's 16th summit in Maseru in August of 1996, the SADC including 
South Africa moved a step closer to becoming <a 'free trade area by signing a trade protocol 
agreement which should be in place by May, The protocol provides the legal framework for 
the phased reduction and eventual elimination of import duties and other measures 
restricting free trade in the Southern Mrica region over an eight year period" In addition, it 
makes provision for existing arrangements like the customs union and bilateral agreements. 
The protocol, however, does not go into detail about the time period over which the tariffs 
will be reduced. Although the general feeling is that the process should be a speedy one in 
the hopes that it will open up South Mrica's markets and address the massive trade 
imbalances within Southern Africa, South Africa is in favour of a longer phasing period. 
According to Alec Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry the assertion that this is an attempt 
for South Africa to maintain the status quo has no foundations as "the fact is that the trade 
imbalance within the region is growing rapidly in our favour in spite of tariffs .. ,.if you 
remove these trade barriers faster, they will accelerate even further in our favour:" (Africa 
News Service, 1996, Internet). 
It is to South Africa's advantage to become part of the mooted Indian Ocean Rim 
Trade Bloc that could eventually comprise 22 member states stretching from Australia right 
through to Malaysia. For there are identifiable interests, unity of thought, confluence Qf.size 
and levels of development that favour the encouragement of free trade through market-
friendly policies that have already been applied voluntarily (Financi'al Mail, October 27, 
1995). Furthermore, such an initiative would offer a total population of around 1.5 billion 
people, amongst which one third are urbanized. This has vast implications for the 
development of skills as well as a market for consumer durables and industrial equipment. 
The idea of the formation of the Indian Ocean Rim Trade Bloc was first mooted 
publicly by Pik Botha in Delhi in 1993. India and Mauritius who were becoming 
increasingly concerned at being shut out of its foreign markets responded positively. As a 
result, the three countries became the main driving force behind discussions held in 
Mauritius in April 1994. Together with Australia, Kenya, Singapore and Oman it was then 
decided to create a forum that would "pursue mutual co-operation in trade, investment, 
infrastructure, tourism, science, technology and human resource development" (Financial 
Mail, December 1, 1995, Internet). 
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However, the official stance is a cautious even exploratory one with the initial 
emphasis on building up mutual trust. It is also apparent that any formalized structure is not 
on the cards for quite a few years. At this point in time it appears as if South Africa is more 
interested in forging bi-Iateral trade relations. 
-t; .. 
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to reVIew the theoretical debates around international 
competitiveness. It showed that although outward-orientated strategies have the highest 
correlation with economic success, the government has an important role to play in guiding 
the development process and that the issue of whether the government should intervene or 
not has shifted to "the nature of its role and the conditions under which intervention can be 
effective" (Black, 1993:204). However, emphasized was the very real risk of a government 
failing to design or implement sound policies due to a variety of factors. Despite this it was 
argued that the fact remains that it is possible to intervene effectively and that there is a 
strong need for pro-active government policy to promote international competitiveness. 
~ . 
It was in this context that the next section went on to attempt to demonstrate that 
although trade policy can be a significant influence in the attainment of international 
competitiveness, the changing nature of the global arena of trade and the demands it imposes 
on other countries, is just as important a factor. Hence the importance of South Africa 
finding a niche in the current world economic order. It was therefore argued that South 
Africa would have to design policies that are consistent with trends in international trade. 
However, in order to do this South Africa would have to have an intimate understanding of 
to its own needs, interests, its priorities and how to pursue them. Only once a balance 
between the two is attained would South Africa be able to truly become part of the 
international world of trade. 
It is in this context that the next chapter goes on to examine the effect that past trade 
-" 
policies have had on the international competitiveness of South Africa's industries. 
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Chapter Two 
A Background of South Africa's Trade Policies, 1972 - 1990 
2.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a review of the debates surrounding international 
competitiveness and the changing world economic order that South Africa is presently re-
entering. It emphasized the centrality of sound policies corresponding with effective 
~- -
government intervention. This chapter attempts to demonstrate this point by examining how 
South Africa's past trade policies have effected its international competitiveness and 
productivity. 
2.2. South Africa's Economy 
South African industry is not without its merits. It has a large and diversified 
manufacturing sector and has established several areas, mainly in heavy and technologically 
demanding industries such as metallurgy, chemicals, paper and some industrial mining 
equipment, that have matured behind protective barriers into inte~ational competitiveness. 
Despite such achievements, large areas of South African industry suffer fro~(f wide 
spread malaise of uncompetitiveness, the lack of technological dynamism and declining 
productivity. It is a well documented fact that South Africa's annual average growth rate in 
real GDP has been declining consistently since the mid 1960s. Table 1 demonstrates that 
between 1961 and 1992, the average annual growth rate in GDP declined from 5.94 to ! ~03. 
Table 1 
Average Annual Growth Rates in Real GDP (percent) 
1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-92 
GDP 5.94 5.15 3.49 3.13 1.36 1.03 
.. 
Source: Fallon and da Stlva, 1994 
The composition of GDP has also changed. Traditionally the sector accounting for 
the largest share of GDP, the mining sector has declined tremendously since the mid-1960s, 
not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to other sectors of the economy. As a result, 
the manufacturing sector has replaced mining as the leading sector of the economy and is 
now the principal component of GDP (Fallon et al. 1994). The performance of the 
manufacturing sector, however, also reflects the decline in real GDP growth. For it has been 
26 
characterized by low (and occasionally negative) total factor productivity growth, combined 
with much lower employment and output growth for the last two decades. 
2.3. What is to blame? 
There are many factors that have contributed to the slow growth experienced since 
the 1970s. High inflation, negative real interest rates at times, acute balance of payments 
deficits and excessive government spending have all played their part. After all, the 
importance of a viable macroeconomic framework for sustainable growth is fibst important. 
Political factors have also influenced growth. The Sharpville massacre in 1960 
appears to have had little impact, as GDP growth continued until 1965. After the Soweto 
Uprisings in 1976, however, growth declined substantially and the imposition of trade and 
financial sanctions in 1985 exacerbated its downward decline. Although their was a 
recovery in growth between 1986 and 1988, increasing political uncertainty and growing 
social unrest have contributed to the subsequent decline. 
According to (Moll, 1994) the evidence points more to inappropriate trade policies 
and ineffective state intervention. South Africa performed very well during the 1930s and 
1940s, due to appropriate policies. However, economic policy became internally orientated 
rather then taking advantage of the potential opportunities on rapidly expanding world 
markets. Industrial exports received negligible attention and the rand was to strong to make 
industrial exports profitable (Moll, 1994). As a result, in order to keep the balance of 
payments healthy, inefficient direct controls over imports were instituted, while the tariff 
structure became world renown for its complexity and intractability. 
There is then the issue of government intervention, the size and type of which has 
also been proven to be crucial in developing countries. In South Africa's case, prior to 1950, 
intervention in the markets worked well and was appropriate given the external environment 
it faced. Thereafter, it became incompetent and ineffective. The South African state 
intervened extensively in industrial development. Endeavouring to control and steer labour 
and capital markets favouring low-productivity sectors and firms at the expense of modem 
manufacturing and services, it had poor technology policies and high government spending 
(Moll, 1994). In addition, intervention as a support for political objectives appears to have 
been a high priority with government initiatives such as Arrnscor, Sasol, Atlantis Diesel 
Engines and Mossgas absorbing massive quantities of investment in capital-intensive 
projects. 
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Consequently, South Africa currently faces complex problems of restructuring and industrial 
competitiveness, the origins of which lie in its trade strategy of import substitution, which 
was instituted in the early twentieth century. 
2.4. Trade Policy in South Africa, 1972 - 1990 . 
Industrialization in South Africa has taken place mainly through a process of import 
substitution, whereby production for the domestic market has been favoured by high 
protection, thereby making production for the domestic market more- profitable than 
production for exports. While the basis for South Africa's export expansion has been a 
heavy reliance on its minerals and highly capital-intensive first-stage processing industries. 
By 1972, it was evident that import substitution was no longer a source of growth and had 
become increasingly capital-intensive. As a result, South Africa began the process of 
liberalizing its protection system accompanied by a reorientation of trade policy towards 
exports, whereby export promotion and assistance schemes were introduced in order to 
accommodate the lack of international competitiveness. 
2.4.1. Import Liberalization 
-.-
Prior to 1972, the main instrument of protection was the use of import controls 
which were tightened or relaxed according to the state of the balance of payments (Bell, 
1992). The GATT, however, frowned on the use of import controls on balance of payments 
grounds and as a result in 1972 the government began the process of eliminating quantitative 
restrictions and replacing them with equivalent t~ffs. 
Between 1972 and 1976, -quantitative restrictions were graduaUy relaxed. However, 
due to major episodes of the real appreciation of the rand, no further progress was made 
until a partial recovery was experienced in 1983, after which the process of eliminating 
import controls accelerated. Furthermore, in 1985, the authorities relaxed import permits, 
also a form of import control. Further relaxation of quantitative restrictions continued after 
1985, and by the early 1990s had been reduced to around 10 percent (mainly on agncultural 
products and textiles). Considering that around 77 percent of South Africa's imports had 
been subject to import controls in 1983, this was a considerable achievement. 
As import controls were reduced and replaced by increasing tariffs to limit the impact 
on industry, this did involve a certain amount ofliberalization, as according to Bell (1992), 
the new tariff levels were lower than the tariffs implicit in the import controls. Tariffs took 
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the form of higher ad valorem tariffs and import duties, giving a higher level of protection 
ag~nst lower import prices. 
In the latter half of the 1980s there was a partial erosion of the substantial progress 
in import liberalization that had been achieved by 1985. It started with the severe economic 
downturn experienced between 1984 and 1986, 'which had the obvious effect of increasing 
the number of applications for protection in the form of ad valorem and formula duties. 
Furthermore, substantial import surcharges were introduced in October 1988 to compensate 
r- -
for balance of payments disequilibrium caused by sanctions which were instituted in 1985. 
Despite the substantial liberalization of the trade regime in the past decade, serious 
problems still remain. Much still needs to be done to the tariff structure in order to reduce 
the distortions created in the local manufacturing industry such that competitiveness is not at 
any real level. South Africa's tariff structure is also one of the most complex in the world 
due to excessively frequent tariff changes, the profusion of tariff rates and the complicated 
manner in which tariffs are levied. Compared to developed countries, South Africa is a 
highly protected economy with an average duty rate twice as high as New Zealand, the 
country with the next highest level of protection. 
2.4.2. Export Promotion 
Traditionally, the mining industry and highly capital-intensive first stage industries 
have contributed the greatest share to total merchandise exports. Exports in manufactured 
goods have been neglected, as protection has made it far more lucrative to produce f-Of -the 
domestic market with insufficient efforts having been made to counteract these effects With 
- - -
the long-term prospects of the mining industry looking extremely gloomy, and the 
subsequent decline in the terms of trade against primary goods and simple manufactured 
goods, it was becoming clear that manufactured exports would have to be relied upon to a 
far greater extent, to become the source of much needed economic growth. In fact, it was 
-" 
becoming evident that the main burden for the expansion of total exports was fallin&- chiefly 
on the manufacturing industry. 
Several significant events In the early 1970s indicated that South Africa was 
becoming serious about restructuring its export trade. The first of these was the 
appointment of the Reynders Commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade of South Africa 
in 1972. The Commission recommended that South Africa diversifY its economy, focus on 
the need to expand the manufacturing sector while simultaneously looking for new markets 
for its exports (Leysons and Thompson, 1994). Although an export incentive scheme was 
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not proposed by the Commission, the Export Development Assistance Scheme was, 
however, introduced in 1972, involving a tax allowance for marketing expenses incurred in 
connection with exporting. 
The trend continued when in 1977, the van Huysteen Committee was appointed to 
review the system of export incentives. Th~< result was a new, considerably reinforced 
system of export incentives to assist exporters with the comparatively higher cost of local 
production and the high cost of delivery to markets, which came into effect from September 
1980. Accordingly, exporters became eligible for customs duties drawbacks and exemptions 
from customs duties paid or payable on imported materials used in manufacturing goods for 
export (Bell, 1992). This system was however, unwieldy, and was not used as an instrument 
to acquire free access to more competitive inputs. It also coincided with a massive real 
appreciation of the Rand and the onset of world recession, the result of which was the 
beginning of a sharp decline in South Africa's exports. 
. In 1988, the Board of Trade and Industry (BTl) published "A Policy and Strategy for 
the Development and Structural Adjustment of Industry", proposing much greater support 
~ 
on a selective basis to promote the structural adjustment of chosen industries (Black, 1993). 
The central objective was to enable the manufacturing sector to compete effe~tively in 
export markets by instituting a series of sectorally based structural adjustment programmes 
aimed at improving the competitive capability of local industry. Export industries were 
divided up into three groups. The first category comprising mainly primary and intermediate 
products would not require export assistance either because of a natural comp<!fative 
advantage, or because assistance_ would not substantially increase exports to warrant it, or 
because the product should only be exported in a more beneficiatetl form. The second 
category comprising those industries already contributing significantly to exports would for 
a variety of reasons need assistance to maintain and increase the export performance. 
Finally, the third category comprising mainly intermediate and finished manufactures with 
-" 
export potential would require encouragement through assistance. Importantly, _the BTl 
emphasizes the need for performance requirements as a criterion for the granting of 
assistance. 
The Report argued that government policy should act in support of industries with 
actual or potential comparative advantage. Additionally, it emphasized the necessity of 
supply side measures such as the improvement of productivity and the mode of technology 
transfer. Although the BTl's structural adjustment programmes were never fully accepted, 
important components were adopted by the motor vehicle industry. Additionally, other 
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structural adjustment programmes were partly put into practice, such as for the clothing 
industry. 
The BTl's proposed structural adjustment programmes have, however, been the 
source of a major disagreement between the BTl and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTl), with the DTI arguing that they were Complicated, unmanageable, unaffordable and 
not "in line with the emergence ofa more market orientated direction" (Black, 1993:212). 
The DTI's rejection of the BTl's selective support was followed, in April 1990, by 
r- -
the introduction of the General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS), a new and more powerful 
system of export subsidies, currently the major export incentive scheme in place. The GElS 
was designed to assist firms in offsetting the price disadvantage faced by South African 
exporters in international markets, by providing a tax-free financial incentive to exporters 
based on the value of exports, the degree of processing and the local content of the exported 
product. Furthermore, the DTI went on to release its "Modification of the Application of 
Protection Policy" in June 1990, a Report proposing the reduction of protection and 
reorientation of industry towards external markets, to be discussed in the following chapter. 
- -~ 
2.5. The Effectiveness of Export Promotion Measures 
According to Holden (1990), the export incentives introduced in the 1970s were 
simply an attempt to address part of the bias which existed against manufactured exports in 
the 1950s and 1960s and did not necessarily mean a switch to a trade strategy of export 
promotion. In fact, the strategy was initially implemented in a half-hearted manner -due to 
the differences in opinion within government on the importance and means of promoting 
exports, as well as the imposition of sanctions which resulted in the main thrust of policy 
intervention remaining in support of strategic self-sufficiency (Black, 1993). 
Considering the performance of exports since 1970, (See Table 2), the dismal 
performance of exports between 1980 and 1985 from 4.1 percent to 1.5 percent is 
significant. Between 1985 and 1990, exports improved somewhat from 1.5 to 2.4 percent, 
despite the imposition of sanctions. Significant, however, is that they did not reach the 
export growth rates experienced between 1970 and 1980 (See Table 3). 
Taking the export performance of the manufacturing sector as a whole in relation to 
the need to accelerate the export growth rate, the results have been disappointing, as the 
growth rate between 1985 and 1990 at 12.7 percent was lower than for the period from 
1970 to 1980 at 20.4 percent (See Table 3). 
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Table 2 
Exports of Major Economic Sectors of the South African Economy, 1970 - 1990 
(Percentage Share of Sector in Total Exports) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
-< 
Agriculture 6.2 6.3 4.1 1.5 2.4 
Mining 44.6 46.6 54.1 53.2 42.4 
Manufacturing 43.5 40.3 37.5 39.4 47.8 
Services 5.7 6.8 4.3 5.9 7.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Bell, 1992 
Table 3 
Exports of Major Economic Sectors of the South African economy, 1970 - 1990 
(Annual Rates of Growth in percent) 
-. 
1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 
Agriculture 21.9 13.1 17.5 25.4 18.3 
Mining 22.5 26.7 24.6 -9.1 3.6 
Manufacturing 19.5 21.2 20.4 -7.9 12.7 
- "'" - . 
Services 25.6 12.2 18.7 -2.8 11.8 
Total 21.4 23.0 22.2 -8.8' 8.4 
Source: Bell, 1992 
When exami~ng the individual components of the manufacturing sector, however, 
these results are seen not to be a true reflection of the export expansion of other sectors (See 
Table 4). This is because South Africa's natural-resource-based sectors, in particular food 
products, chemical and basic metals, have traditionally contributed the most to its 
manufactured exports and hence the export growth rates are largely a reflection of 
movements in these sectors. Table 4 demonstrates this point, for the annual rate of growth 
for food products declined from 12.9 percent between 1970 and 1980 to 8.5 percent 
between 1985 and 1990. Similarly, chemicals declined from 28.3 percent to 5.7 percent and 
basic metals from 27.3 percent to 7.1 percent during the identical periods. Hence the slower 
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percent experienced between 1970 and 1980 (See Table 3), which was largely due to the 
deterioration of chemical and basic metal exports, which in tum was due to a worldwide 
decline in demand in commodity-type exports of the two sectors. On the whole 
manufactured exports, excluding chemicals and basic metals, actually grew significantly 
-;€ ~ 
faster in the period 1985 to 1990 than 1970 to 1980. (See Table 4). 
Most significant, was the remarkable increase in the export growth rate of the metal 
products groups of industries, the metal products sector itself, machinery, electrical 
~- -
machinery and transportation equipment excluding motor vehicles (See Table 4). 
Table 4 
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Exports Valued in Current US Donars (percent) 
1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 
Food Products 2l.5 4.9 12.9 -10.2 8.5 
Beverages 16.9 27.7 22.2 -l.1 39.3 
Textiles 
-1.5 10.1 4.1 2.9 14.6 ~ c.-
Leather 11.3 13.8 12.5 3.3 14.§ 
Products ".-
Printing 42.3 -4.5 16.5 -10.7 25.7 
Chemicals 18.6 38.8 28.3 -6.4 5.7 
Rubber 12.6 21.6 17.0 -8.5 20.2 
Products 
- "'" - . 
Plastic Products 
-4.1 17.0 5.9 -1.2 35.2 
Pottery 41.2 -18.1 7.6 -12.2 28.5 
Non-Metallic 24.9 15.2 20.0 -19.9 22.7 
Mineral 
Products 
Basic Metals 1l.S 44.9 27.3 -7.1 7.1 
-
Metal Products 21.2 8.8 14.9 -12.6 27.9 
Machinery 11.5 17.8 14.6 -10.8 22.6 
Electrical 14.9 16.4 15.7 -11. 7 35.1 
Machinery 
Transport 4.8 -3.5 6.7 -6.1 49.8 
Equipment 
Source: Bell. 1992 
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Even though the primacy of manufactured exports as a policy objective was 
becoming increasingly firmly established by the mid-1980s, the acceleration of export 
growth in non-traditional exports, was largely due to the fact that the manufacturing sector 
only exported in times of recession. The problem started in the early 1970s when the South 
-~ .. 
African economy became increasingly susceptible to problems of demand insufficiency 
(Fallon et al, 1993). The accelerated growth of manufactured exports came at a time where 
South Africa had experienced adverse foreign exchange shocks, the subsequent devaluation 
r- -
of the rand and the accompanying domestic recession. Manufacturing firms and suppliers 
alike, were therefore, pressed with declining domestic sales. The recession, thus, not only 
pushed manufacturing firms into the international export market but also allowed them to 
get their inputs at internationally competitive prices from suppliers who were forced to 
lower their prices. According to Holden (1985), subsequent interviews with the main 
exporters of manufactured goods indicate that on the whole, the South African 
manufacturing sector has only attempted to export when domestic sales have been falling. 
Export expansion did not occur because industry came to~ept it as the general 
-- --....,. 
way to go, rather, it occurred because exporters had to cover their costs, and finding 
markets abroad was the only way. According to Bell (1992): 
" .... domestic recession was a significant factor underlying the growth and structure 
of South African manufactured exports after 1983." 
The representatives of most of these exporting firms actually stated that with a recovery of 
domestic demand, they would not look for export markets and would even have cut' d~Wn 
on their existing exports (Belli et ar, 1994). 
This raises the question of what role government policy actually played in influencing 
the performance of exports? Compared to export growth in the 1980s, manufactured 
exports grew relatively rapidly at 20.4 percent between 1970 and 1980, with negligible 
export subsidies (See -"fable 3). Between 1980 and 1 ?85, exports deteriorated significantly 
to -7.9 percent, despite the "new, considerably reinforced system of export incentives", 
which was introduced in early 1980 on the recommendation of the van Huysteens 
Committee. With the same system in place, non-traditional exports then increased between 
1983 and 1990. The implication is that exports were on the whole determined by other 
factors rather than the export subsidies. The export incentives involved in the structural 
adjustment programmes and the GElS may have contributed to export growth in 1989 and 
1990, but there had already been a noticeable increase in a wide range of manufactured 
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exports before these measures were introduced. According to Bell (1992), policy makers 
were in effect swimming with the tide of a favourable export trend, not created by them. 
2.6. Has Trade Policy Contributed Towards Making Industry Competitive? 
We have argued in the previous chapter that the attempts made by the South African 
government during the 1970s to expand industrialization by means of export-led growth, 
while at the same time protecting and subsidizing capital intensive industtJes _have generally 
been a failure. These policies, together with the imposition of trade and financial sanctions 
led to economic and social decline in the 1980s. By the late 1980s it was well recognized 
that on the whole, South Afiican industry was not internationally competitive and that 
effectively, South Afiica had not successfully made the transition to a more outward-
orientated trade regime. 
It has already been discussed how the measures that have been introduced to 
counteract the negative effects of protection, have not been sufficiently effective in reducing 
the policy-induced anti-export bias. Import substitutio~ hcts_ made production for the 
domestic market more profitable than for exports as these policies have biased producers in 
downstream, "end-stage" manufactures towards the domestic market and against exporting. 
Although South Afiica has witnessed a resurgence in exports since 1985, much of this 
export growth has been driven by excess capacity rather than a genuine commitment to 
profitable exporting (Belli et al, 1993). This has effectively neutralized the stimulus that 
export activity can provide to the upgrading of competitive abilities, as it has enabled fums 
to raise prices in the domes~ic market above those prevailing under free-trade conditions, 
thus effectively raising the costs of inputs which have increased production costs, and made 
exporting firms less internationally competitive. Attempts have been made to compensate 
exporters for the high costs of domestically supplied inputs, but as discussed earlier they 
have been ineffective__ The introduction of the GElS in 1989 helped, but these export 
subsidies are excessively costly and the scheme is due- to be phased out at the end of 1997, in 
any case. 
Furthermore, South Afiica has also foregone many potentially lucrative opportunities 
by deepening import replacement instead of using the capabilities that had been developed in 
the early and easier phase of import substitution as a basis for penetrating export markets in 
consumer goods industries, the route the East Asian countries took. This is not to say that 
import substitution is a "bad" strategy, as the initial stage did contribute to employment 
creation and economic growth, but this was largely in consumer goods. Efficient import 
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substitution industries in many intermediate and capital goods, like machinery and motor 
vehicles, however, require advanced expertise and markets and production runs which are 
considerably beyond the size of the South Africa economy, which is why import substitution 
in South Africa can only be seen as a partial success. 
Resources have also not sufficiently b~en diverted towards commodities with low 
domestic resource cost per unit of foreign exchange, and are predominantly skewed to 
highly capital intensive upstream sectors of industry. For sure, these industries have become 
r~ -
more export-orientated, but their terms of trade are highly correlated with mining and have 
been declining. As outward-orientated trade strategies are more conducive to building 
competitive industries, this means that South African industry has not been sufficiently 
exposed to those forces which can create competitiveness. For activities geared to world 
markets should benefit the economy by improving productivity performance and by making 
fuller use of capacity, due to the fact that exporters usually face stronger pressures to 
develop competitive capabilities in quality and price, than producers relying on the domestic 
market. International competition tends to encourage capabilities that are more directed to 
- '-
cost reduction and product development. The need to be cost efficient forces firms to 
upgrade both capital and labour markets, while the need for product developmentmilkes it 
vital for firms to continuously upgrade production techniques by developing or importing 
new technologies. This technological diffusion and transmission of ideas is extremely 
important for continued growth, as it is a well documented fact that technical inefficiency in 
developing countries is an important source of low productivity and poor competitiyen~ss 
(pack, 1988). 
The entire tariff structure is also problematic. The system is subject to excessive 
frequent changes, the tariff structure is overly complex, and the dispersion of the tariff 
schedule is exceedingly high. Additionally, the tariff structure reflects the influence of a 
"haphazard system that has grown up over time and has no underlying strategy of protecting 
-' 
infant industries during their learning period" (LalI, 1993:60). For a country iustifying 
protection on infant industry grounds, this is a poor reflection of a lack of coherence in trade 
policy. There has been no policy on the duration of protection and there have been no 
performance requirements imposed on protected industries. Essentially, South Africa has 
protected industries regardless of their competitive potential, for as long as a producer could 
supply at least 60 percent of the domestic market, protection has been granted. As a result, 
South African firms became used to a state of permanent protection without having to worry 
about foreign competition. This had the effect of lulling firms into a state of policy induced 
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laziness whereby it was not necessary to have cutting edge technology and hence quality, 
which inhibited the advancement of other important factors, like the development of skills 
training. 
It is a well documented fact that one of the major causes of lack of competitiveness 
-~ .. 
is high production costs. The effect of import substitution in South Africa has been exactly 
this, for according to Fallon and da Silva (1994: 73), it has meant that the South African 
economy has "undertaken the production of commodities requiring pro,STe§sively higher 
domestic costs per unit of foreign exchange earned". If the basis of exports is the 
requirement of having an underlying cost competitiveness, it is clear that South African 
exporters are at a distinct disadvantage. In the South African Chamber of Business 
document "A Concept for the development of a New Industrial Policy for South Africa" 
(SACOB: 1991), it is argued that the main source of the lack of competitiveness are the high 
costs of manufactured intermediates, together with high capital and labour costs. According 
to this document, the cost of manufacturing in South Africa is on average 15 percent higher 
than the average OECD country. Finally, there has also been little concept of the selective 
~ - ~ ~ 
promotion of activities that may have led South Africa's future exports. 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to demonstrate that South Africa's past trade policies have not 
been effective in facilitating competitive development and have, in fact, detrimentally 
affected the international competitiveness of its industries. This was demonstratect by 
analyzing data clearly indicat!ng that past trade policies did not have the desired effect of 
improving overall growth and hence competitiveness. The conclusion was thus reached that 
the effectiveness of South Africa's past trade policies were not beneficial to industry, for· 
they were neither related to gains in industrial competitiveness nor effectively implemented. 
By 1990 it w~s generally recognized that South Africa was not internationally 
competitive and that some major restructuring was in order. It is in this context that chapter 
three goes on to examine how trade policies have developed in the 1990s. 
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Chapter Three 
A Review of South African Trade Policy in the 1990s 
3.1. Introduction 
As we have argued in the preVIOUS chapter, by the mid-1980s the pnmacy of 
manufactured exports as a policy objective was becoming firmly established. This was 
accompanied by general government consensus for the restructuring and reorientation of 
r- -
industry towards external markets. However, substantial differences arose as to how this 
was to be achieved. This became particularly clear when the Board of Trade and Industry 
(BTl) released "A Policy and Strategy for the Development and Structural Adjustment of 
Industry", which resulted in a major clash with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
who had different prescriptions to those advocated by the BTl. It is in this context that this 
chapter attempts to provide a review of the development of trade policies in the 1990s. 
3.2. The Development of Trade Policy in the 1990s 
- ~ 
Trade reforms were imminent when in 1990 South Africa became a participating 
member of the GATT which had set itself the task of eliminating direct contmls frQm\vorld 
trade as well as lowering tariffs 30 percent across the board for all nations. Having 
previously opted out of the many voluntary codes of the GATT, South Africa could no 
longer avoid participation for as Stel Naude, Trade and Industry Director-General at the 
time, argued, "There is no way that we can reintegrate with the global economy outside. of 
the GATT" (Financial Mail, May I. 4, 1.992)._ 
In June of the same year, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) released its 
''Modification of the Application of Protection Policy", a report proposing the reduction of 
protection. 
The IDC sa:v the current system of protection defective due to the cost raising 
implications of the relatively high level of protection and the misallocation of r:esources 
resulting from the sectoral variation in protection levels (Black, 1992:214). It also identified 
a number of more specific deficiencies in the system: 
• the lack of regular tariff reviews; 
• no comprehensive lowering of tariffs; 
• the limited scope for further import substitution; 
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• the selective approach to protection which in South Africa's case meant that protection 
was on the whole granted according to need rather than potential comparative advantage; 
• the administrative difficulties of selectivity; 
• the use of excessively high formula duties wlpc.h had notable cost raising implications; and 
• duties imposed to replace quotas and supposed to counter dumping, instead being used 
against normally priced goods. 
It proposed that South Africa put far more emphasis on export gfowth and less on 
domestic protection. The major instrument to achieve this would be the reduction of 
protection, accompanied by measures to encourage exports and supportive macroeconomic 
policy. 
Tariffs would be reduced by the abolition of formula duties and their replacement by 
more specific anti-dumping measures, and by the gradual downward adjustment of tariffs to 
pre-determined target level over the next five to six years. The Report recommended a 
virtually immediate 10 percent reduction on all tariffs of 40 percent and higher and a five 
percent reduction on tariffs of between 20 and 39 percenfthe setting of target rates for 
tariff levels would be determined by a consultative process with the affected industries and 
for the most sensitive industries, provisional plans would be made. Infant industries would 
still qualify for protection at levels similar to those prevailing in more established industries. 
In exceptional cases, protection would be granted at higher levels, subject of course to 
phased reduction. Although the Report indicated that protection levels would remain quite 
high after the reductions, the main instrument of protection would revert to an undervalued 
exchange rate. Furthermore, it recommended the immediate abolition of import surcharges. 
Influenced by the 1987 World Development Report which argues in favour of a 
neutral trade regime, the IDC argued for a much more uniform and lower tariff structure and 
opposed selective intervention, by proposing an automatic system that would operate within 
the overall framework of lowering levels of protection. Despite this, it stated that the 
existing selective schemes for the clothing and motor vehicles industries, should continue, 
and that the capital goods and electronics sectors deserved special support, although 
protection was not the best instrument in providing this. 
The Report proposed the expansion of exports through the encouragement of a 
series of supply-side measures such as lower company tax, encouraging higher domestic 
savings, a realistic exchange rate, the improvement of skilled labour. The reduction of tariffs 
would lead to lower subsidies under the GElS and the phasing out of other export subsidies 
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as well as tax concessions designed to favour exports, with compensation taking place in the 
form oflower company tax rates. The Report also argued for the implementation of a stable 
and realistic exchange rate in order to reduce uncertainty and to increase confidence. 
The BTl's "A Policy and Strategy for the Development and Structural Adjustment of 
Industry", discussed in the previous chapter,<is seen to differ markedly from the IDC's 
proposals as to how to go about reorienting industry to external market. For while the BTl 
envisioned the reorientation of exports towards external markets through export assistance 
in the form of input cost assistance, the IDC envisioned the implementatf~n -of supply side 
measures to do the job. The BTl rejected the removal of protection, while the reduction of 
protection formed an integral part of the strategy proposed by the IDe. Yet another 
substantial difference was the BTl's justification of selective intervention on dynamic 
comparative advantage grounds, while the IDC outrightly rejected selectivity with some 
exceptions.. Essentially, however, the view that it was necessary to reorientate industry 
towards external markets was held in common by both, it was just the means that differed. 
According to Black (1993:213), the IDC report "was representative of government 
thinking". However, when by the end of 1991 no moves had been made to discourage 
demands for higher protection the question then is posed as to whether this W~l) ihdeed 
"representative of government thinking", for a major reason for this lag was a stalemate 
within government echelons. On the one hand their were those who argued that tariffs could 
not be reduced until taxes were lowered, inflation reduced and productivity improved, while 
on the other hand there were those who argued that inflation could not be reduced an~ _ that 
competitiveness could not be enhanced until tariffs were reduced (Financial Mail, August 16, 
1991). The ex<;use given was that the government was still waiting for comment from the 
South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), who had already indicated that the slashing 
of tariffs without measures to reduce the high capital costs, tax, interest and inflation rates, 
would be tantamount to committing suicide. 
-" 
In September 1991, SACOB released its -long awaited report which essentially 
supported the DTI, but expressed that "a more cautious approach will be required than what 
is apparent in the IDC Report" (SACOB, 1991:28). Further reservations were expressed 
regarding the insufficient attention accorded to the transitional costs of adjustment and the 
abandonment of selective intervention. 
By April 1992, almost two years after the government had received the IDC Report 
and despite the fact that it had received SACOB's reply, no decision had been taken on its 
implementation. It was becoming evident that although the lowering of tariffs was generally 
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supported, the IDC's Report was a bit too progressive for everyone's liking, including the 
government's. According to Finance Minister at the time, Derek Keys, the lowering of 
tariffs should be done "carefully" and not "too quickly if no mechanism existed to retain 
employment or to re-employ the unemployed" (Financial Mail, April 24, 1991). 
The debate provoked by the IDC's recC;nimendations of a phased sharp reduction in 
tariffs died down and with it the hopes of it ever being implemented, particularly when Key's 
released his ''Normative Economic Model" which omitted any programme of bold reform. 
r - -
For although it was argued that South Africa would only be able to achieve an envisaged 
GDP growth target by becoming fully competitive in internationally tradable products by 
creating "smarter industries", it was decidedly vague on any policy guidelines as to exactly 
how this was to be achieved (Financial Mail, March 19, 1993). 
However, the debate was revived in February 1993 when the World Bank released 
its "South Africa: Economic Performance and Some Policy Implications", a Report arguing 
for South Africa to reform its costly and unwieldy trade policies. In particular, the report 
highlighted South Africa's excessively high trade barriers, the detailed and complex tariff 
- ~ 
schedule and the excessively wide range of tariffs. Additionally, it criticized the strong anti-
export bias that was still prevalent and argued for a streamlined and modified rebaw-system 
in order give exporters greater access to imported inputs and capital goods at world 
competitive prices (Financial Mail, March 19, 1993). 
At the same time, 1993 was South Africa's turn come under the microscope of the 
GATT Council. The purpose of such reviews was aimed at creating transparency _and 
understanding of two-way problems and needs, between the GATT and the country under 
review at the particular time. This entailed the presentation of two reports, one by the 
GATT secretariat and one by the concerned country. 
The secretariat's report for South Africa was published at the beginning of June 
1993. Full credit was given for the reforms to normalize the post-apartheid economy with 
the report welcoming the lowering of tariffs and reduced import controls and the ~creased 
emphasis on export promotion and open-market reforms. However, it found that the latter 
was only being "cautiously pursued" and that the tariff structure and review mechanism 
underlying it were far from stable or transparent (Financial Mail, June 4, 1993). The implicit 
message was that South Africa could do. better. Despite this, it took numerous revised 
offers before the GATT accepted South Africa's industrial offer. South Africa finally 
became bound by all the GATT codes (with a few exceptions) by signing the Marrakesh 
Agreement in April 1994, thereby making a full commitment to reform the protective system 
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and to reduce protection levels by a third within five years. South Africa's industrial offer 
became effective from 1 January 1995, coinciding with the GATT becoming the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), had the following main characteristics: 
• The replacement of all quantitative import controls on agricultural and industrial products 
with ad valorem tariffs;, . 
• the rationalization of the 10 000 odd tariff lines into between 5 000 and 6 000 tariff lines, 
to be completed by the end of the five year period; 
~ - -
• the increase of the 55 percent odd tariff lines bound to the GATT to 98 percent, thus 
ensuring that tariffs could not be raised without permission from the WTO; 
• the standardization of tariff lines from the current 80 different levels of between 0 and 
100 percent, into six levels with raw materials and capital goods having tariffs of between 
o and 10 percent, intermediate products-components having tariffs of between 10 and 15 
percent, and consumer goods having tariffs of between 20 and 30 percent; and 
• the majority of industries having to comply with the GATT programme over the 
prescribed five years, the exceptions being the clothing and textiles industries which 
would have 12 years to reach a maximum tariff of 45 percent instead of 30 percent, and 
the motor vehicle industry which would have 8 years .to reach a maximum tariff of 50 
percent instead of the 30 percent (Hirsh, 1994). . 
The GATT recommendations represented an upper limit above which the tariffs 
could not go ie. a ceiling and not an absolute level. This flexibility meant that the 
government would be able to set tariffs at a lower level than the GATT ceiling, at the 
recommendation of the Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTl), which as will be discussed further 
on, is exactly what happened. 
Another notable occurrence in early 1994 was when the National Economic Forum 
(NEF) commissioned the Monitor Company, international experts in national industrial 
strategy formulation, to assist South Africa in this area. The NEF constructed a Project 
Committee, with representatives from business, labour, government, the IDC and the Central 
Economic Advisory Service (CEAS) which in consultation with the Process Convenors of 
the NEF managed all aspects of the Project. Hence the Global Advantage of South Africa 
Project was born. 
The first stage of the project was intended to diagnose the current competitive 
situation and indicate the critical weaknesses that would have to be overcome to increase 
economic growth. It was not intended to develop specific national policies and cluster 
strategies, which is to comprise phase two of the Global Advantage of South Africa Project. 
42 
-
Eventually, in April 1995, the Monitor Company released ''Global Advantage of 
South Africa Project, Phase One: National Industrial Strategy Issues", an 83-paged 
document in which an objective analysis of the South African economy, especially the 
weaknesses that would need to be overcome in order to achieve international 
competitiveness, was provided. 
The report argued that the principal economic goal of the nation is to provide a high 
and rising standard of living depends on the nation's ability to achieve high and rising levels 
r- -
of productivity growth. This requires continual upgrading which in tum requires improving 
productivity in existing activities, moving into higher productivity segments of the industries 
in which it competes and entering entirely new industries with actual or potential prospects 
of high productivity. 
Accordingly, the Monitor Group Report suggested an alternative path towards 
improving competitiveness informed by five main factors, namely, factor conditions; related 
and supporting industries; demand conditions; and strategy, structure and rivalry, the 
Diamond of national advantage, and finally the role of the government. Factor conditions 
are referred to as the basic inputs necessary to compete in ~ industry. Basic factors refer to 
the resources that are inherited by a nation such as natural resources and clima.te, 0f • .that are 
created through moderate investment such as unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Advanced 
factors refer to those resources that are developed through sustained and advanced 
investment in both human and physical capital, such as modem digital data communications 
infrastructure, world-class university research institutes ad highly skilled technicians, _ It. is 
argued that it is the latter that are more important to developing competitive industries and 
that "a nation's stock of factors at any particular time is less important than the rate at which 
they are created, upgraded and more specialized to particular industries" (Monitor Group, 
1995:9). 
Related and supporting industries (the cluster) are referred to in the context of the 
presence of home-based suppliers and related industries in those products, components, 
machines or services that are specialized andlor integral to the process of innovation in 
industry, strongly influence competitive advantage. For not only do they create advantages 
in downstream industries in various ways, but far more significant is the advantage created 
by the fostering of close working relationships, the exchange of know-how and the mutual 
pressures to progress. 
Demand conditions are referred to in the context of a demanding market which is 
what underpins success for the closer a company is to leading edge buyers, the sharper are 
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the signals sent by the firm and its management. Home demand can thus play a significant 
role in influencing the perception of buyer needs and the capacity of firms to improve their 
products and services. 
With regards to strategy, structure and rivalry, the report maintained that domestic 
rivalry plays a vital role in achieving internatio~' success. Although foreign competition is 
acknowledged as an important stimulus for improvement, it is argued that it is rarely an 
effective substitute for domestic rivalry which "provides the essential motivation for firms to 
r~ -
make investments and take the risks necessary for competitive advantage" (Monitor Group, 
1995: 12). 
With regards to the role of the government, the report argued that the most 
productive role of the government is to "improve the quality of the inputs (factors) firms can 
draw upon and to define a competitive environment and rules of the game that promote 
innovation and upgrading" (Monitor Group, 1995:13). It is not the role of the government 
to forge comfortable business-government partnerships, to relax pressures on industry and to 
seek to eliminate risks. Rather, the role of the government is perceived to be one of a 
- .. 
catalyst and a challenger, to encourage and even to pressure companies to improve their 
competitive performance even if the process entails painful and difficult adjustments, 
According to the report, it was asserted that it is the achievement of these five 
attributes which together with a stable macroeconomic framework create the base for 
competitiveness and growth. After an overview of South Africa's position in world Jracle 
using detailed studies of individu~ firmS and the clusters in which they resided, the Monitor 
Group concluded that South Africa has what is referred to as a weak "national diamond" 
with only few strengths. Essentially, however, poor bureaucratic capabilities; poor strategic 
capabilities; weak: clusters; low rivalry and poor skills, machinery and work organization 
have resulted in high relative costs and/or low quality and service. 
-' 
The report pointed out that policies like the GElS, high tariffs, quotas and ~bsidies 
have all had a negative impact on international competitiveness, implying that policies have 
been designed without understanding how competitiveness is created. Furthermore, the 
administration of policies had been inefficient and rates very low in terms of effectiveness. 
Although the purpose of the Monitor's Report was to produce the framework for policy and 
not the specific policies themselves, it nonetheless included some criteria which were seen as 
the basis for achieving competitiveness. These included strong, co-coordinated clusters; 
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world-class strategic capability; strong skills, machinery and work organization; high rivalry 
and a capable bureaucracy 
The monitor's analysis appears to be a comprehensible document that shows great 
potential if it proceeds to the second phase. However, we will have to wait and see if phase 
two is released as to whether it was taken seridusly. 
3.3. Conclusion 
r- -
The purpose of this chapter was to examine how trade policies developed in the 
1990s. It was shown that although there was the general agreement that industry should be 
restructured and reorientated towards external markets, the prescriptions as to how this was 
to be achieved differed, sometimes markedly. Despite this policy makers have battled ahead 
with 1995 seeing the implementation of various measures designed to ultimately make 
industry more internationally competitive. However, certain weaknesses in the area of 
implementation were revealed and it is in this context that the following chapter goes on to 
provide a critique of the implementation of these policies by using the clothing and textile 
- ~ 
industries as a case study. 
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Chapter Four 
A Critique of Trade Policies: The Textile and Clothing Industries 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, discussions<ai1d reviews of trade policies has revealed 
weaknesses in the areas of implementation. This chapter therefore proposes a critique of 
implementation using the clothing and textile industries, as a case study. 
4.2. A Critique of Implementation: The Textile and Clothing Industries 
The clothing and particularly the textile industry have historically been accustomed 
to hiding behind high tariff barriers which has discounted them and other sectors from 
having to compete against more efficient overseas firms. 
Currently, the textile industry is in a serious predicament, the roots of which lie in 
import substitution policies implemented in 1963. Between 1963 and 1974, the policies 
worked very well with the average annual growth in textile products reaching 9 percent per 
annum. However, since then the industry has been in declin-e.· Between 1975 and 1983 rates 
fell to 3 percent per annum and to a further 2 percent by 1991. Between 1991 and )993 the 
figure had reached a dismal -2 percent per annum (Weekly Mail and Guardian, July 15, 
1994). 
Initial moves were made in the direction of reform in 1989 when the textile and 
clothing industries both agreed upon a five-year tariff reform plan. However, the. t.~xtile 
industry, accustomed to high levels of protection, delayed implementation. The clothing 
industry on the other hand continued to push for low tariffs on textiles so that they could 
make clothing as cheaply as possible. In April 1992, the clothing and textile industries were 
granted interim protection in order to adjust and to make changes in preparation for the 
introduction of tariff reforms. However, by September 1993 large sections of both the 
clothing and textile i~dustry had not taken advantage of this respite for "they ha~ neither 
adjusted nor attempted to make any changes in order to face the reality of the international 
textile trade in the next five years" (Financial Mail, September 3, 1993). According to 
Textile Federation President, Mervin King, however, there was no need to accelerate the 
commencement date of the phase-out period for tariffs, or to apply a shorter period than 
eight years to any sector of the textile pipeline. 
In the same year, a working group chaired by the Board on Tariffs and Trade's Nic 
Swart was commissioned to devise a new long-term strategy for the two industries. 
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However, the report was more an industrial strategy outlining how the government could 
help the industries upgrade their technology, training and productivity, reduce costs and 
compete globally, and did not include recommendations on the tariff issue. In fact, the 
industries were granted yet another interim one-year period, which became effective from 
November 1 1993. According to Swart, howe~er, during this period, "the industries would 
continue their discussions and various committees would be looking into the problem areas" 
and "the long-term tariff policy together with the new industrial strategy should be in place 
by January 1, 1995" (Financial Mail, September 3, 1993). 
In April 1994 the "good times" well and truly became something of the past when the 
textile industry was forced to face the real world of the GATT, higher competition, strained 
profit margins and much-needed improvements in efficiencies. However, indications were 
not good, particularly when the textile industry started to attempt to obtain concessions to 
delay the implementation of the GATT. It became evident that the textile industry, so used 
to getting its own way in the past, was "not changing strategies or even recognizing that 
these could affect their companies" (Weekly Mail and Guardian, July 15, 1994). 
~ ~ 
In July 1994, Swart's working group finally came completed the long-term strategy 
with recommendations that were accepted by the industries as well as their trad~limons. 
They included: 
• the phasing down of duties on imports over 10 years; 
• the extension of the Duty Credit Certificate System and the GElS; and 
• government support in the form of low-interest Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) loans for upgrading technology and improving skills and assistance for export 
ventures. (Finance Week, July 29-August 3, 1994). . 
The government's view that the industry could do a lot better, however, came across 
clearly when the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Trevor Manuel, criticized the 
industries expectations of extended periods of grace for tariff reform together with huge 
financial assistance from the state (R4.2 billion), to see it over the long adjustment period 
(Financial Mail, September 2, 1994). 
Industry experts also expressed concern at the demands of a ten year phase-down 
period, particularly as a ten year period was regarded to be virtually the equivalent of two 
technological life times. Furthermore, doubt was expressed as to whether the textile 
industry was actually prepared to face international competition, particularly without 
substantial tax breaks from or the government propping up the market. As if to reinforce the 
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view that the days when manufacturers could rely on government intervention were over, 
1995's budget announced the elimination of import surcharges. 
Eventually the government's final proposals for the clothing and textiles industries 
was for a seven-year phase-down period implemented in September 1995, without the 
extension of the GElS and the Duty Credit Certificate System and without the high degree 
of government intervention envisioned by the industries. It was argued that it was not the 
purpose of the proposals regarding restructuring to drive companies out of business but 
rather "to serve to make a break with the past in policy-making; they are negotiated, and 
place South Africa beyond the exclusive reliance on tariffs as the policy instrument" and that 
instead "we have developed new instruments which focus on supply side measures such as 
human resources development, work organization and technology enhancement" (Weekly 
Mail and Guardian, June 15, 1995). However, noticeable was a lack of clarity of what 
precisely these supply side measures would be. 
. The National Clothing Federation had proposed that protection on textile fabrics be 
phased out more quickly in order to give clothing manufacturers the time to acquire a 
-- -:...-
competitive export footing by having their input costs reduced. This was rejected even 
though in a budget speech Manuel had criticized input suppliers who practiced impqrt'parity 
pricing behind high tariff barriers, implying a gap between what the government would like 
to do and what it actually does. However, it has been suggested that Manuel was more 
lenient on the textile industry because of its proposed R3 billion investment plan to upgrade 
archaic and globally \lncompetitive equipment, in line with the view that there is a g~neral 
need for re-investment and the upgrading of plant and machinery to the standards of foreign 
technology (Financial Mail, June 23, 1995). 
The government's final offer came as a big disappointment to the industries with, the 
Textile Federation together with the SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) 
arguing that tariff adjustments would be meaningless without other changes and that "the 
.. 
phase-down must be postponed until the necessary- 'Supply side measures are dev~sed and 
implemented" without which "we will have no strategy and just a seven-year duty phase-
down" (Financial Mail, August 18, 1995). The supply side measures that were envisaged 
included: 
• an export incentive package to compensate for the abolition of the GElS and the Duty 
Credit Certificate System; 
• training support measures with the government providing 50 percent of the cost; interest 
rate subsidies to equalize South Africa's high rates with much lower rates in competitor 
countries; and 
48 
• a social restitution program to train and assist workers loosing their jobs as the industry 
upgrades itself and reinvests in modem technology. 
It was emphasized that these measures would not be handouts but assistance 
schemes on the condition that industries increase productivity and meet export targets. 
However, apart from a R5 million per annum:nanagement consultancy subsidy and a small 
working group looking into other general measures, Trevor Manuel had already indicated 
that the government had no funds for such measures. 
Although the National Clothing Federation argued that it would be unreasonable for 
the government to grant yet a further reform extension, it was also concerned by the supply 
side measures issue, particularly with regard to the failure to extend the Duty Credit 
Certificate System (DCCS) to the import of material for the manufacture of value-added 
clothing, a system which allows clothing and textile exporters a 30 percent credit against any 
future import tariffs, based on the value of exports. This caused much discontent, especially 
as the clothing industry had been identified by the GATT as thefrade sector with the biggest 
global growth potential due to the fact that value-added business was one of the fastest 
- ~ 
growing sectors. However, on cue the government then decided to extend the scheme for -a 
further three years. 
Furthermore, it criticized the government's failure to control the widespread illegal 
import of clothing and textiles that was flooding the industries, due to lax customs controls. 
Government proposals to let Zimbabwe export clothing and textiles to South Africa at 
preferential tariff rates just exacerbated the issue as it raised the fear that the ZimbaQw~an 
border would become an open door for even more illegal imports to flood the industries 
(Financial Mail, September 1, 1995)_ 
South Africa's anti-dumping system has in fact been the subject of much debate and 
criticism from: 
"local industries and unions who believe the system is not responsive to concerns 
about unfair -'imports that are causing material injury, particularly in the face of 
liberalization and lower tariffs; foreign exporters and importers who believe the 
system is administered in a way that is protectionist; and trading partners who are 
concerned about it's inconsistency with international rules and practices" (Weekly 
Mail and Guardian, March 22, 1996). 
In response, the Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT) was urgently requested to investigate 
and make substantive recommendations on the restructuring of the anti-dumping system. 
Apart from this, the issue of supply side measures has not abated, particularly with 
regard to how the restructuring of the textile industry will be financed. These fears were 
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allayed when in the 1996 budget Chris Liebenberg announced that R180 million would be 
set aside for supply side packages for the entire manufacturing spectrum, a far cry from the 
R4.2 billion that was envisioned only for the clothing and textiles industries proposed by 
Swart in 1993 (Weekly Mail and Guardian, March22, 1996). The Textile Federation 
dismissed it as an insignificant amount. SACTWu's Ebrahim Patel agreed with the Textile 
Federation, arguing that subjecting the industries to the market before restructuring has 
taken place was equivalent to abandoning it, and that instead "the industry should be 
restructured along three pillars: active industry policy measures to improve technology, 
quality and training; trade reforms to gradually liberalize tariff barriers and promote exports; 
and a social adjustment programme to retrain workers" (Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 
22, 1996). What the government has done instead was just to phase-down import duties 
with only vague mentions of supply side measures. According to a SACTWU survey, an 
analysis of over 200 companies shows that between September 1995 and February 1996 
close on 20 000 jobs had been lost in the clothing, textiles and leather industries and that 
another 100 000 jobs are estimated to go as a result of the seven-year phase-down period. 
To date, pressure for the implementation of supply side incentives has not abated. In 
May of 1996, submissions were made to the government on investment-led grqwtn and 
development options in the clothing and textiles industries. The views were wholly 
supported by SACTWU who once again emphasized that "tariff reduction on its own does 
not constitute an effective industrial policy" and that it "needs to be accompanied by a range 
of supply side measures and social support during the restructuring process such as w_orker 
skills and technology" (Financial Mail, July 26, 1996). 
The government has however proceeded full speed with liberalization and have 
proposed various changes which are arguably meant to improve the competitiveness of 
South African industry. It is this area to which we tum in slightly greater detail. 
-" 
4.3. Tariff Liberalization 
The reduction of protection is finally well underway in the clothing and textile 
industries with the government's seven-year tariff phase-down period for the industries 
implemented in September 1995. Furthermore, general progress towards an outward 
orientated stance is reflected in a number of achievements, namely, the replacement of 
former quantitative restrictions with tariffs, the rationalization of the tariff structure by 
almost halving the number of tariff lines, the abolition of surcharges in September 1995, the 
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phasing down of tariffs which for the majority of industries began early on in 1995 and the 
phasing out of the GElS which is to be completed by the end of 1997. 
What about the effectiveness of tariff reductions thus far? According to a document 
released by the Department of Finance in June 1996 and the government's main macro-
economic strategy "Growth, Redistribution atfd· Employment, a Macroeconomic Strategy" 
(GEAR), at the sectoral level the evidence is mixed. Among the sectors facing the largest 
declines in nominal protection, some increased both output and employment, while others 
showed the opposite trend (Gear, 1996:47). It should, however, be noted that the five 
sectors facing the largest tariff reductions in 1995 account for only 17 percent of total 
manufacturing employment. Those sectors which are major employers namely food, 
clothing, motor vehicles, electrical machinery and metal products showed that despite tariff 
cuts a range of firms managed to expand output and employment. (See Table 4). Thus far, 
preliminary indications are that the potentially negative effects of liberalization have been 
kept .low, partly as a result of the economic recovery and a resurgence in exports, with the 
recent depreciation of the rand shifting relative prices in favour of exporters. 
Table 4 
Changes in Tariffs, Output and Employment, 1994 - 1995 (in percent) 
Employment Output Exports Imports Tariff Changes 
Food 
-1.5 0.0 25.8 26.1 15.4 
Beverages 
-5.8 5.7 -11.8 22.2 64.3 
- -- - -
Leather Products 3.6 7.0 15.0 10.2 -78.7 
Wood Products 
-5.1 4.8 -16.2 18:2 -20.0 
Paper Products 4.8 10.9 7l.0 35.7 -40.0 
Printing and 2.1 -3.9 12.1 12.5 -81.9 
Publishing 
Glass products 
-':3.9 6.6 _~14.5 26.8 -52.9 
Other Non-Metallic 
-7.1 9.1 29.0 37.8 -50.0 
Mineral Products 
Iron and Basic 0.8 14.0 22.9 28.6 -72.7 
Steel 
Non-Ferrous Metal 
-3.4 17.9 119.3 122.9 -16.7 
Metal Products 
-2.2 5.4 55.1 29.8 -56.3 
Machinery 13.1 12.5 66.8 2.5 -77.8 
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Electrical 
-3.0 23.4 58.7 32.3 -58.8 
Machinery 
Motor Vehicles 9.4 15.8 19.1 41.0 -62.5 
Other Transport 
-4.9 -14.2 N/A N/A 0.0 
Equipment 
~-
Other Industries 
-3.5 -11.7 -6.7 -18.6 -12.5 
Tobacco 
-6.7 -2.3 69.8 -8.1 110.0 
Textiles 
-7.6 12.0 16.5 15.8 -7.9 
~- -
Clothing 9.9 14.1 18.0 -8.7 -4.1 
Footwear 7.6 5.7 2.6 40.6 20.0 
Furniture 6.3 8.5 39.2 37.6 -40.0 
Chemical Products 
-1.4 6.4 43.7 28.5 -36.4 
Rubber Products 7.6 8.6 58.3 31.3 -71.0 
Plastic Products 14.6 10.2 49.7 28.4 -81.0 
Total 1.1 7.4 33.7 27.5 -5.6 
Manufacturing 
~ -
-
~ 
Source: Growth, Employment and Redistnbuuon. a Macroeconormc Strategy. 1996 
It appears then, that to all extent of purposes, reduction in protection has been 
successfully implemented and that although various industries are not having an easy time, 
government is not succumbing to lobbying pressures to slow down the process. In fact, as a 
result of the current real depreciation of the rand, the government is pushing ~ for . a 
compensating lowering of tariffs. Although stating that they will be implemented in such a 
manner so as to lower prices for industrial inputs and low-income households, avoid job 
losses in sensitive sectors and to remove price distortions in domestic markets, extreme 
caution should be adopted in assessing the potentially negative impact that these faster 
reductions may have <:n the economy. The words of Trevor Bell (1992) should be heeded in 
this case, who as early as 1992 was questioning whether it was necessary for South Africa to 
further liberalize its foreign trade. He noted that a major consideration with regard to 
further import liberalization through tariff reductions was that without a measure of 
macroeconomic stability such measures could pose serious problems for the economy. He 
concluded that "comprehensive tariff reductions must await a substantial improvement in the 
performance of the economy, so that they can be implemented without the danger of foreign 
exchange or fiscal crises, or intolerable effects on output and employment in import-
competing industries" (Bell, 1992:34). 
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Although the reduction of protection has gone relatively smoothly, a significant 
complaint, not only from the clothing and textile industries, is that the phase-down of tariffs 
has not been accompanied by enabling supply side and other support measures, the area to 
which we now tum. 
4.4. Supply side and Other Support Measures 
A valuable lesson that can be drawn from the experience of the NICs is that without 
the complementary measures the correct general trade orientation does nof amount to much. 
These not only included tariffs, quotas and subsidies but importantly supply side measures 
"aimed at securing competitive advantage through attracting investment and technology into 
specified sectors, thus accelerating productivity growth and technical change " (Black, 
1993:217). 
It goes without saying that it is vital to strengthen a country's human capital base in 
order to promote the growth of technological capabilities. This includes both pre-
employment education as well as on-tM-job training and further formal training of 
employees sponsored by the private sector. This does not corite-about on its own and many 
governments accept the role that they must play to support the education system .. , The 
NICs, for example, clearly demonstrate that their industrial success depended to a large 
extent on the creation of human capital by extensive and continuous investments by the 
government. 
It is also not only the volume of investment in education that is important, as the 
quality and relevance of the education is just as significant to industrial development. 
Unfortunately, especially in-developing countries, the private sector invests relatively little in 
upgrading skills. According to Lall (1993), this may be due to three reasons. Firstly, the 
failure to be fully aware of the skill needs of the technologies being used. Secondly, not 
having access to skills training facilities despite enterprises realizing that skills are deficient. 
Finally, enterprises who are not sure whether they will be able to recoup the full benefits of 
their investments and hence are not be willing to investment large amounts in the upgrading 
of skills. 
It is essential that the development of technological capabilities also form an integral 
part of the supply side measures implemented by government. This development can only 
effectively take place if firms can access the formal and information technology networks 
that exist between firms and between firms and research and other institutions. 
Unfortunately a serious problem in many countries with the science and technology 
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infrastructure is the lack of effective linkages with the productive sector (Lall, 1993). As a 
result, although most countries do have networks of technology institutions the inability of 
mostly developing countries, especially, to harness them means that they have been unable to 
raise productive efficiency in industrial enterprises. It is thus up to the government to design 
policies which link them intimately to the needs·of manufacturing enterprises. 
The term supply side, however, does not only include capability development. The 
document, "Support Measures for the Enhancement of the International Competitiveness of 
South Africa's Industrial Sector" (1995) submitted by the Trade and Industry Chamber of 
Nedlac demonstrates the point. Apart from proposals to enhance techn()logy and the need 
for active government policies which will help increase investment in human capital, a 
number of other proposals are put forward. Among other things these include assistance to 
sensitive industries, assistance packages to competitive industries who have invested in their 
own competitiveness in the past, concessionary finance for specific policy aims, incentive 
packages which should ideally lead to viable ventures being undertaken which would never 
have been undertaken without the incentives, and a shift from grant-based incentives to 
selective tax incentives (Financial Mail, November 24, 1995). ... 
I have discussed the concept of supply side in relative detail because the new 
approach to trade and industrial policy in South Africa is the shift away from demand side 
interventions like tariffs and subsidies which in the past have raised the price of outputs, to 
supply side measures designed to lower the cost of productivity enhancing investments and 
to expedite progress up the value chain. In the government's GEAR, this shift to supply side 
measures is emphasized. 
In the area of concessionary finance, it mentions that the IDC will continue to 
provide loan finance, equity and credit guarantee facilities and will adapt its programmes to 
satisfY new needs, while the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) has been 
expanded to include a simplified scheme applicable to smaller enterprises (Gear, 1996: 11 & 
12). 
In the past the IDe was actively involved in providing equity and loan capital for 
massive new projects which were initially encouraged by tax concessions introduced in late 
1991, which were recently been stopped. These allowed for write-offs of capital 
expenditure on machinery and installations beginning in the year that it was incurred rather 
than when production began. To qualifY for these concessions, however, projects had to be 
on a scale which made it internationally competitive, by adding a minimum of 200 percent to 
the value of the product as well as exporting at least 60 percent of it. 
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The IDC, for example, has recently assisted Hulett Aluminium with a R2.5 billion 
hot-and-cold aluminium milling facility and Alusaf with a R5 billion aluminium smelter 
thereby making it the seventh largest producer in the world (Black, 1993). Although in the 
long term this kind of capital intensive investment, which if the industry is successful, earned 
substantial amounts of much needed foreign exchange which would in tum strengthen the 
balance of payments and the gold and foreign exchange reserves, a major concern is that 
such highly capital intensive investments will create little direct employment. However, 
these additional strengths would make it possible for more expansionary- macroeconomic 
developments to take place, which would necessarily include a whole host of labour-
intensive low-tech industries. Additionally, the sophisticated industry would generate other 
employment from suppliers and from services both to the company and its employees 
(Finance Week, July 8-14, 1993). The implication is that although employment gains would 
initially not be great, they would not only improve over time, but also be long lasting. 
. The recent signing of a 10 year metal supply contract between Alusaf and Hulett 
Aluminium, for example, is likely to provide the impetus for substantial growth and 
development of the downstream aluminium industry. It is fhis1Gnd of endeavor that should 
be encouraged by the government, for not only is it a step further up the beneficiation ladder 
(added value), but it is also likely to expand the potential market for fairly labour-intensive 
products. 
It is thus important for the government to have a clear strategy with regard to 
downstream development. This should form part of a long term development plan for 
industry as a whole. It goes without saying that this cannot be done without equal 
participation by all affected parties. The phasing out of this capital cost write-off is an 
example of a lack of clear cut policy, for it is actually an effective incentive. Take for 
example a most recent case concerning the wool textile industry. With world demand 
currently building for wool-based clothing, and with South Africa beneficiating only 10 
percent of its wool crop and exporting 90 percent in j.ts raw form, it is not surprising that the 
industry has realized the huge potential. In fact, it has estimated that if the total output of 
wool was beneficiated into manufactured garments and exported this would increase exports 
to about R15 billion as opposed to the present export value of R1 billion, as well as 
providing employment for a further 400 000 people. But "the high capital cost of building a 
world-competitive worsted textile plant, with state-of-the-art technologies and expensive 
machinery", according to chairman of SA Fine Worsted, Malcolm Hughes, "requires an 
incentive package" (Financial Mail, May 17, 1996). Accordingly, incentives were proposed 
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by the industry which included corporate tax rates at 10 percent, 8 percent fixed interest 
loans (for 15 years) from the IDC, duty-free import of production plant, equipment and 
inputs, a 100 percent investment allowance in all new plant and machinery, and accelerated 
depreciation. 
However, the government appears to have got the message for in GEAR, measures 
to stimulate competitive and labour absorbing industrial development were indeed 
mentioned. Apart from these schemes introduced by the IDC, other measures included an 
accelerated depreciation scheme which would be introduced for all new investments in 
manufacturing; the tax allowance programme which would apply to qualifying plant and 
equipment which is acquired and brought into use for the first time during the period from 
July 1 to the end of September 1999; the replacement of the Regional Industrial 
Development Programme (RIDP) by a tax holiday available to completely new pre-approved 
projects initiated during a window of three years. This would begin in the last quarter of 
1996. with approved projects getting tax exemptions for a period of time determined by 
regional allocation, job creation and priority industries. The tax holiday would come into 
effect as soon as the project became liable for tax, not to be-used beyond the tenth year after 
the initial investment is undertaken (p.12). 
Closely related to this are the twelve industrial priority industry investigations as well 
as the regional industrial locational studies with the aim of identifYing mechanisms to 
enhance the competitiveness of selected industrial sub-sectors which may be eligible for the 
proposed tax holiday, while specific interventions would be considered when necessary. __ . 
Only time will tell whether these measures are effective in stimulating competitive 
and labour absorbing industries, but at least it appears as if government has realized the 
importance of encouraging endeavours such as that proposed by the textile wool industry. 
In the area of technology and training, GEAR refers to various industrial innovation 
support programmes~ These include the incentive in terms of the Special Programme for 
Industrial Innovation, the matching grants under the Technology and Human Resources For 
Industry Programme which is designed to strengthen the relationship between educational 
institutions and industry, and the technology transfer programme of the DTI which is to be 
converted into an agency dedicated to facilitating access by firms to needed technologies. 
However, in a document released by the National Institute for Economic Policy 
(NIEP), "From the RDP to Gear: the Gradual Embracing of Neo-liberalism in Economic 
Policy", the proposed "enhancement" of industrial innovation support programmes is 
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criticized for a lack of detail (NIEP, 1996: 15). It is crucial that this fonn an integral part of 
industrial strategy with extensive and continuous investments by the government. This is 
particularly significant in light of the fact that the development of technological capabilities 
in South Africa has been poor and is in a state of decline. Strong in scientific research, 
South Africa is far weaker in technology application. Although a more outward-orientated 
trade regime and a restructured import regime will most likely be associated with enhanced 
investments in technology there is no automatic link between trade orientation and the 
r -
development of technological capabilities. To improve the chances of this happening, 
however, extra government support is a necessity. 
According to Joffe et al. (1993), there is a need for specific policy interventions 
designed to: 
• reverse the current decline in overall national expenditure on R&D and, in particular the 
decline in business expenditures on R&D; 
• strengthen the incentives to finns to invest in the development of in-house technological 
capabilities; 
• affect the tenns of technology transfer; 
• restructure the funding and other incentives that currently affect the operations of the 
system of statutory science councils; 
• encourage links between the universities and manufacturing industry; and 
• identify and acquire capacity in significant future technological developments. 
Certainly some of these is~ues have been. addressed. Additionally the textile industry'S 
proposed R3 billion investment plan to upgrade capital technology is encouraging. 
However, the necessity for the government to invest in the enhancement of technological 
capabilities cannot be overemphasized, for it plays a crucial role in the development of 
internationally comp~titive industries. It is thus important for the government to pledge a 
full commitment by designing policies that address the'source of the problems. 
It has already been mentioned that an important element to the success of industrial 
development in the experience of the NICs was extensive and continuous government 
investment in the enhancement of human resource development. In assessing the stance of 
the government towards the issue it appears as if it is high on their list of priorities. In 1995 
Manuel went on about the development of new instruments "which focus on supply side 
measures such as human resources development, work organization and technology 
enhancement" (Weekly Mail & Guardian, June 15, 1995, Internet). In GEAR "enhanced 
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human resource development" (p. 2) is mentioned as one of the factors that will contribute 
towards the expansion if the economy. 
As mentioned earlier, Gear mentions the matching grants under the Technology and 
Human Resources For Industry Programme designed to strengthen the relationship between 
education institutions and industry. However, in ·a world where it is becoming apparent that 
intra-firm education, various forms of supplementary adult education and industry-wide 
training are a primary requirement in industrial competitiveness, is this sufficient to reverse 
the drops that have been experienced in training as well as in the attempts to re-train the 
unemployed? It is clear that some sort of nationally integrated system of training which links 
different levels of training and education system is going to have to be established, so that 
"workers will be afforded the potential to proceed along a career path to which modules of 
accredited training contribute (Joffe et al. 1993: 112). Furthermore, the past failure to invest 
in training must be extensively analyzed so that recommendations can be made to rectifY the 
situation. This would mean the development of some sort of communication network 
between firms, education institutions and the government in order for firms to be fully aware 
of the skill needs of the technologies they are using, to be able t'O -effectively remedy deficient 
skills, and being confident that they will recoup the full benefits of their investments: .. Simply 
strengthening the relationship between educations and industry is only partially addressing 
the problem, especially as it is the attitudes of the business sector towards the participation 
and development of its labour force which needs fundamental altering. Certainly, the 
exposure to higher levels of international competition are bearing fruit as both the bu~il!ess 
sector and the government are realizing the importance of human resources development in 
contributing towards the development of industrial competitiveness, but focus must now be 
on designing a national strategy as soon as possible, before South Africa falls even further 
behind. 
Noticeable in GEAR however, is the lack of detail as to the extent of its involvement 
ill developing human resources. This is one area that needs extensive public sector 
involvement. In fact, I would go as far as to assert that the government must lead the way 
with significant support and even pressure, for firms to invest extensively in employee 
training. If this does not happen the private sector is extremely likely to underinvest and not 
capitalize. However, at the same time the government cannot expect the entire burden to 
fall on the private sector. This means that it is going to have to put an end to the chronic 
dis saving that is so prevalent in government echelons in order to ensure that some resources 
can at least be diverted to investing in the development of human resources. 
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4.5. Selective Intervention 
Although it appears that selective intervention is on the agenda, not much IS 
elaborated on the twelve industrial priority investigations mentioned in the GEAR. 
The experience of the NICs has demonstrated that the targeting of support rather 
than a neutral trade regime was the key facl:dr in attaining new areas of international 
competitiveness. South Africa has to a large extent been scarred by protection which was 
not linked to the attainment of international competitiveness and improved productivity. 
r- -
However, this should not deter from the fact that if protection is used with these goals in 
mind, it can be successful. This is once again demonstrated by the strategy used by the NICs 
who unlike classic import-substituting economies which generally use protection 
indiscriminately, very much like South Africa, used limited protection by promoting a few 
activities at one time. 
The message IS clear. If a government is looking at creating new areas of 
comparative advantage through state intervention, or protecting· infant industries: 
"assistance needs to be targeted at a limited number of sectors and must be based on 
the principle of reciprocity, with stipulated requiremeRts in terms of performance 
objectives, productivity gains, export targets, new investment, employment creation 
and the like" (Black, 1993:224 & 225). . 
Furthermore, it is essential that the main goal is improved competitiveness and productivity. 
A good example in this case is South Africa's electronics sector which has far weaker 
domestic capabilities than most other economies at its income level (Black, 1993). A 
measure of import substitution could assist the sector in improving its performance, but it-is 
absolutely crucial that it is d(,me in such a way that the top priority is to become competitive 
in world markets within a specified time frame. 
Although selective targeting can result in misguided intervention and large scale rent 
seeking behavior and corruption, this need not to be the case if stipulated requirements such 
as those mentioned __ above are effectively implemented. Additionally, it is crucial that 
retribution measures are taken if firms do not meef'the requirements, for leniency simply 
leads to exploitation and increasing lobbying. South Africa especially, cannot afford firms to 
once again become used to a complacent way of life. 
Closely related to the misperception that import substitution cannot be used as an 
effective strategy in the short-term, is the assumption that reduced trade protection will 
automatically see the rise of new and/or expanded internationally competitive industries and 
export expansion. See Strydom (1994), Cline (1982), Black (1993), Edwards (1993), 
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Agosin (1993) and Joffe et al. (1993). This misperception is based on two assumptions. 
Firstly, reduced prices for imported goods will reduce overall production costs. Although 
this is self-evident, it should be noted that the same result can be achieved by other methods 
(Black, 1993). Additionally, Helleiner (1990) points out that domestic prices will not fall 
given the possibility of formerly oligopolistic'producers becoming importers with market 
power. 
Secondly, is the assumption that firms will respond to foreign competition by 
becoming more efficient and competitive. However, exposure to foreigll-c~mpetition is a 
double edged sword. For as Bell (1990: 17) points out, it "can just as easily kill off certain 
industries as spur them to greater heights of efficiency and competitiveness". Import 
liberalization itself does not automatically lead to improved competitiveness and export 
expansion, but has to be accompanied by efficient allocation and measures to reduce the 
potentially negative impact of the costs of adjustment. 
Outward-orientated policies are simply not sufficient to shift an economy to higher 
levels of growth. Appropriate supply-side measures, which address the issues of 
productivity, technology and other factors are crucial to export success. For this secures 
competitive advantage through attracting investment in the development of human r.es()Urces 
and technology and thus accelerates productivity growth and technical change. Without 
this, a country is unlikely to effectively improve its export performance. 
4.6. Customs and Excise Control 
A major concern to so many industries is the issue of South Africa's flawed system of 
customs and excise control. -As mentioned in the previous chapter, thus far the government 
had failed to control the flood of illegal imports into South Africa. Amongst the most hard 
hit are the clothing and textiles, electronics, tyre, music, edible oils, pharmaceutical, drugs, 
arms, vehicle spares and liquor industries. 
At the moment, the Customs and Excise Act ,allows a company accused of import 
fraud to plead guilty and be fined, but the matter never comes to court, the company is not 
convicted and not even its name may be revealed, as this would constitute an invasion of 
privacy (Financial Mail, December 22, 1995). Perhaps it is time that a more hard line 
approach is taken where the accused is brought to a court of law, after all import fraud is an 
illegal act. A stance has to be taken wherein the message is clear that offenders will simply 
not be tolerated. 
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At the source of the problem are the high levels of staff d~moralization and 
corruption. The administration of an extremely complicated and irrational tariff system 
which hinders the effectiveness of anti-dumping mechanisms and which leads to 
misdocumentation coupled with a lack of basic technology, simply exacerbates matters. As 
a result, of the containers that enter South Afiica only a tiny proportion (between 1 and 3 
percent) can be examined. Durban is the main culprit, being responsible for overseeing more 
then 70 percent of South Africa's containerized goods. However, less then 1 percent of the 
containers entering South Africa via Durban are actually inspected (W~ek1y Mail & 
Guardian, March 22, 1996). Additionally, the break down in customs policing has become 
so severe in sectors like clothing, textiles and electronics, that some companies have resorted 
to hiring private detectives to protect their interests. The situation has grown so bad that a 
private sector initiative, the Customs and Vat Enforcement Caucus representing the most 
hard hit industries, has been set up which aims to stop the flood of illegal imports into South 
Africa. . The Caucus has recently been given permission by cabinet to work closely with the 
police, Inland Revenue, Customs, Trade and Industry and the Reserve Bank's exchange 
control division to prosecute offenders. The number of death threats that have been 
received by members, and the commonplace bribes and corruption amongst go~ermnent­
employed officials gives substance to the fact that illegal importing is big business in South 
Africa. 
Other initiatives include the National Business Initiative, a private sector body that is 
advising the government how to combat crime, as well as the Clothing Federation att~I?pts 
at setting up codes of conduct with unions to try and ensure that all prescribed duties are 
paid on goods (Financial Mail, April 12, 1996). 
It is clear that there has been a decided lack of active government involvement in the 
area of customs and excise, including its Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue Agencies. 
Recent events, however, indicate that at last "the slumbering giant appears to have come out 
of its coma" (FinanCial Mail, April 12, 1996). The government has appeared to have 
overcome budgetary restraints and has been able to harness financial assistance and expertise 
from the private sector. It has allocated a substantial Rl.l billion to the new SA Revenue 
Service, an amalgamation of Customs and Excise with Inland Revenue. This money will be 
used to overhaul the entire system with short-term measures including new border posts, 
more customs officials and tax inspectors, the upgrading of computer systems, mechanical 
sniffers and scanners. 
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Furthermore, South Africa's anti-dumping laws are presently being investigated with 
a potential area of amendment being the separation of the functions of the tariff setting and 
anti-dumping determinations, with further changes potentially including the shortening of the 
time frames in anti-dumping investigations and the aligning of South Africa's anti-dumping 
laws with the provisions of the World Trade Organization (Werks News Desk, 1996). 
Considering that an estimated R2 billion is lost in Customs and Excise duties each 
year, excluding the associated Vat fraud and lost opportunities, these reforms are long 
overdue. It is, however, imperative that resources are allocated efficiently ~d that some 
sort of national strategy is developed consistent with international rules and practices. 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to critique implementation by using the clothing and textile 
industries as a case study. It demonstrated that the restructuring and development of 
industry is without question a mammoth task, one which is going to require active but 
effective government involvement in the process. This was done by discussing how 
implementation has taken place within and how it has ciffected the clothing and textile 
industries. In so doing the contentious supply-side issue and that of the widespread illegal 
- -""-' 
import of clothing and textiles, was mentioned with the implication being that government 
was not showing signs of clear direction. It was in this context that the chapter went on to 
analyze in more detail how the government was handling these issues. This was done by 
discussing the governments macroeconomic strategy in detail. 
It was concluded that although a national industrial strategy is slowly taking place, 
there is still a lack of clarity on this matter, and it is essential that government ensure that 
any present and future measures never deviate from their goal of achieving improved 
international competitiveness and productivity in order to provide jobs for the majority of 
impoverished South Africans. 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
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This study set out to assess the significance of trade policy in promoting the international 
competitiveness of South African industry. Itbovered the following areas: a review of the 
debates surrounding international competitiveness; a background of South Africa's trade 
policies; the development of South Africa's trade policies over the last six years; and a 
critique of implementation using the clothing and textile industries as a case-study. This was 
necessary in order to demonstrate the centrality of trade policy in promoting the 
international competitiveness of South Africa industry. The following section discusses the 
individual chapters in greater detail. 
5.2. Summary of the Arguments 
Chapter one provided a review of the debates surrounding international competitiveness, 
assessing the theoretical arguments for the state, markets and international competitiveness 
in attaining international competitiveness. The centrality of trade policy was established by 
demonstrating that effective government intervention can promote international 
competitiveness. 
In this context, the chapter then went on to discuss the trends in the world market 
that South Africa is re-entering and the implications thereof It was argued that in order for 
South Africa to find a niche in the current world economic order, it would have to design 
policies consistent with trends in international trade. Furthermore, South Africa would have 
to develop an intimate understanding of its own needs, interests, it's.priorities and how to 
pursue them in order for it to be able to truly become part of the international world of 
trade. 
In Chapter two if' was demonstrated how trad€ . policies can influence international 
competitiveness. This was done by examining the effect that South Africa's past trade 
policies had on the international competitiveness of it's industry since the early 1970s up 
until 1990. It was argued that these past trade policies were not linked to the attainment of 
international competitiveness and improved productivity and were thus responsible for the 
difficult problems with regards to industrial competitiveness, restructuring and the 
reorientation of industry towards external markets that South African industry is presently 
faced with. 
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Chapter three provided a review of how South Africa's trade policies have developed in the 
1990s. It argued that although their was general government consensus that South African 
industry was internationally uncompetitive and was in dire need of restructuring and being 
orientated towards external markets, the means as to how this was to be achieved differed 
markedly. This was demonstrated by referring to various key documents clearly showing 
that the development oftrade policies has been an uphill battle. Together with chapter two, 
chapter three revealed weaknesses in the area of implementation. 
Chapter four provided a critique of the implementation of these trade policies by using the 
textile and clothing industries as a case study. It was shown, particularly in the case of the 
textile industry, how reforms were initially resisted, but how the signing of the Marrakesh 
Agreement heralded an era where industry would have to reform or die. Furthermore, it 
showed that although industry had accepted the inevitability of reform, much discontent was 
expressed at the government's lack of clarity with regard to the supply side measures issue 
which it had promised to implement, as well as the widespread problem of illegal imports. 
It was argued that the reduction of protection did not amo~nt to much without these issues 
being addressed. This led to an analysis of how the government was handling th~se'issues 
which was done by discussing its macroeconomic strategy in detail. 
It was concluded that, although the government was moving in the right direction, 
there was still a lack of a coherent industrial strategy which appeared to be rather 
fragmented. Furthermore, not enough was being done by the government and an incr~~sing 
burden was falling on the private sector, such as investment in skills training. 
In conclusion, the debate therefore demonstrates a number of things: 
• That South African industry has traditionally been overprotected which has manifested as 
industrial laziness, low productivity and overall uncompetitiveness. 
• That even when the necessity of trade policy was recognized, implementation ~as quite 
lax. 
• That the transition to democracy in South Africa and the changing nature of the global 
economy has fostered global competition on the agenda and South African business, 
labour, the government and academics have started debating these issues. This debate 
clearly demonstrates that it has been recognized that trade policy is crucial to global 
competitiveness. 
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Hence, despite the difficulties that lie ahead, in the long term internationally competitive 
industries and all the factors that go into making them, will assist in providing sustainable 
economic growth which will in turn improve the lot of many South Africans and South 
Africa as a whole. The effectiveness of trade policies in promoting international 
competitiveness, therefore, cannot be overe~phasized. The challenge which faces the 
government is thus to ensure that future trade policies promote the international 
competitiveness of South African industry. 
65 
Bibliography 
Abedian, I and Standish, b. 1992. "The South African Economy: an historical overview". In 
Abedian, I and Standish, B (eds), Economic Growth in South Africa: Selected Policy Issues. 
Oxford University Press. 
Ago sin, M. 1993. "Trade Policy Reform and Economic Performance, Empirical 
r- -
Experience". In Agosin, M and Tussie, D (eds), Trade and Growth, New Dilemmas in Trade 
Policy. St. Martin's Press. 
Amsden, A. 1992. "A Theory of Government Intervention in Late Industrialization". In 
Putterman, Land Rueschmeyer, D (eds), The State and Economic Development. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bell, T. 1990. The Prospects for Industrialization in the New South Africa. Inaugural 
- c... 
Lecture, Rhodes University. 
Bell, T. 1992. Should South Africa Further Liberalize its Foreign Trade? ET Working Paper 
No. 16, Unpublished Article, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. 
Belli, P. Finger, M and Ballivian, A. 1993. South Africa, A Review of Trade Policies. 
Discussion Paper No.4. Southern Africa Department, The World Bank. 
Bergsten, C. 1996. "Globalizing Free Trade". In Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75. www.ilibrary.com 
Berry, B, Conkling, E and Ray, D. 1993. The Global Economy, Resource Use, Locational 
-> 
Choice and International Trade. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 
Bhagwati, J. "Export Promoting Trade Strategy Issues and Evidence". In Research 
Observer, Vol.3, No.1. 
66 
Black, A. 1993. "The Role of the State in Promoting Industrialization,. Selective 
Intervention, Trade Orientation and Concessionary Industrial Finance". In Lipton, M and 
Simkins, C (eds), State and Market in Post Apartheid South Africa. Witwatersrand 
University Press. 
Brett, E. 1985. The World Economy since the War, The Politics of Uneven Development. 
MacMillan Publishers Ltd. 
Cohen, S. 1994. "Competitiveness: A Reply to Krugman". A BRIE Research Note. 
http://server. berkeley. edulBRIElResearch _notes! 
Drucker, P. 1994. Trade Lessons from the World Economy. In Foreign Affairs, 
January/F ebruary. 
Dutt, A, Kim, K and Singh A. 1994. "The State, Market and Development". In Dutt, Kim 
and Singh (eds) The State. Markets and Development. Beyond the Neo-Classical 
Dichotomy, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Edwards, S. 1993. "Openess, Trade Liberalization, and Growth in Developing Countries". In 
Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 31. 
Fallon, P and de Silva. 1994. South Africa. Economic Performance and Policies. Discussion 
Paper NO.7. Southern Africa Department, The World Bank. 
Frieden, J. 1991. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and 
Wealth. St. Martin's Press. 
Grabowski, R. 1994. "Import Substitution, Export Promotion, and the State in Economic 
Development". In The Journal of Developing Areas. July. Western lllinois University. 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution. A Macroeconomic Strategy. 14 June 1996. 
gopher:!! gopher. anc. org.za: 70!00! govdocs!policy!growth. txt 
67 
Hartridge, D. 1993. "Implications of the Uruguay Round and the New GATT for South 
African Trade Policy". In Baker, P, Boraine, A and Krafchik, W (eds), South Africa and the 
World Economy in the 1990s. David Phillip Publishers (pty) Ltd. 
Hatty, PR. 1993. "The South African Trade Policy Debate: A Business Perspective". In 
Baker, PH, Boraine, A and Krafchik, W (eds), South Mrica and the World Economy in the 
1990s. David Phillip Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Cape Town. 
Helpman, E and Krugman, P. 1985. Market Structure and Foreign Trade. MIT Press: 
Cambridge (Mass). 
Heillener, G. 1990. "Trade Strategy in Medium Term Adjustment". In World Development. 
Vol. 18. 
Hirsh, A. 1994. GATT the Way Forward. In Indicator SA. Vol I}, No. 1. 
Holden, M. 1990. "The Choice of Trade Strategy: Past Reflections and Future Prospects". 
In N attrass, N and Ardington, E (eds), The Political Economy of South Africa. Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press. 
Holden, M. 1992. "Trade Reform: Finding the Right Road". In The South African Joumalof 
Economics, Vo1.60, No. 3, ~epteI.I1ber. 
Hormats, D. 1994. "Making regionalism safe". In Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73. Intemet-
www.ilibrary.com 
Jetro White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment. 199'6. 
http://www.go.JP/WHITE P APERlINVEST96/ 
68 
Joffe, A, Kaplan, D, Kaplinsky, R and Lewis, D. 1993. "Meeting the Global Challenge: A 
Framework for Industrial Revival in South Africa". In Baker, P, Boraine, A and Krafchik, W 
(eds), South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s, David Phillip Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 
Cape Town. 
Lal, D and Rajapatirana, S. 1987. "Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries". In Research Observer. July. pp. 208-211. 
Lall, S. 1993. "What Will Make South Africa Internationally Competitive?" In Baker, PH, 
Boraine, A and Krafchik (eds). South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s. David 
Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd. South Africa. 
Lawrence, R. 1993. "Trends in World Trade and Foreign Direct Investment". In Baker, P, 
Boraine, a and Krafchik, W (eds), South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s, David 
Phillip Publishers (pty) Ltd, Cape Town 
Meier, G. 1990. "Trade Policy, Development and the New Political Economy". In lones, W 
and Krueger, A (eds), The Political Economy ofInternational Trade, Blackwell Ltd. 
Moll. T. 1993. "Once a dog, always a dog? The economic performance of modem South 
Africa". Paper prepared for EBM Conference. Cape Town. 
Monitor Company. 1995. Global Advantage of South Africa Project; Phase One Findings: 
National Industrial Strategy Issues. Conducted for the National Economic Forum. April. 
Moore, A. 1995. "S __ outh African Exporters: Where to now? Part 1 ". In Meyer, CM (ed), 
Sabs Bulletin, Vol. 14, No.2, February. 
National Institute for Economic Policy. 1996. From the RDP to Gear: The Gradual 
Embracing ofNeo-Liberalism in Economic Policy. August 14. 
Nelson, R. 1981. "Research on Productivity Growth and Productivity Differences: Dead 
Ends and New Departures". Journal of Economic Literature, XIX, September. 
69 
Pack, H. 1988. "Industrialization and Trade". In Chenery, H B and Srinivasan, TN (eds), 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vo1.1. 
SACOB. 1991. A Concept for the Development of a New Industrial Policy for South Africa. 
South African Chamber of Business, May. 
SACOB. 1991. Reaction of the South African Chamber of Business to The IDC Report on 
the Modification of the Application of Protection Policy. South African Chamber of 
Business, August. 
Scott, T. 1995. "An Overview of South Africa's Future International Economic Relations". 
In Mills, G, Begg, A and van Nieuwkerk, A (eds), South Africa in the Global Economy. The 
South African Institute of International Affairs. 
Senghaas, D. 1985. The European Experience: A Historical Critique of Development 
- c..-
Theory. Dover, NH: Leamington Spa. 
South Africa and the SADC. 1996. www.southafrica.net/governmentlforeignl 
"South Africa, A Global Player Again?". 1992. In Global Trade, Vol. 1, No.1 October. 
Department of Foreign Affairs. South African Foreign Policy. 1996. Discussion Document, 
July. 
Standish, B. 1992. "Resource endowments, constraints and growth policies". In Standish, B 
and Abedian, I (eds), Economic Growth In South Africa: Selected Policy Issues. 
Oxford University Pr~ss. 
Stem, N. 1989. "The Economics of Development: A Survey". In Economic Journal, 99, 
September. 
Strydom, P. 1994. "South Africa in World Trade". In The South African Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 55, No.3, September. 
70 
Strydom, P. 1995. "International Trade and Economic Growth, The Opening-Up of the 
South Africa Economy". In The South African Journal of Economics. Vol. 63, April. 
Ul Harque, I. 1994. "International Competitiveness: The State and the Market". In Dutt, A, 
Kim, K and Singh, A (eds), The State, Markets<atid Development. Beyond the Neo-Classical 
Dichotomy, Cambridge University Press. 
Wade, R. 1990. Governing the Market. Princetown University Press. 
Weiss, 1. 1988. Industry in Developing Countries: Theory, Policy and Evidence. Croom 
Helm, London. 
White, G. 1988. Developmental States in East Asia. MacMillan Press, London. 
Williamson, 1. 1993. Industrial Policy in South Africa: Export-Led Growth, Foreign 
-- ----. 
Investment and Capital Flight. Paper presented to the Aspen Institute-Idasa Conference on 
South Africa's International Economic Relations in the 1990s, April. 
World Bank. 1987. World Development Report 1987. Oxford University Press. 
SOUTH AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES 
Financial Mail 
16/08/1991, "Breaking the Policy Logjam". 
24/04/1991, "Into the Great Wide open". 
19/03/1993, "Talking Tough on Tariffs". 
04/06/1993, "SA under Scrutiny". 
03/09/1993, "Tackling Knotty Issues". 
14/05/1993, "Under Doctor's Orders". 
02109/1994, "The Cost of Protection". 
23/06/1995, ''No Pain, No Gain". 
21107/1995, "Down but not out". 
18/08/1995, "Seven-Year Itch". 
25/08/1995, "Zipped Tight". 
01109/1995, "New Long Term Quest". 
27/10/1995, "Route to the East". 
10/1111995, "Doubling Up". 
24/1111995, "Tariff Threat to R2.5bn Plant". 
24/11/1995, "Recycling the Dinosaurs". 
01112/1995, "Hulamin Signs with Alusaf'. 
01/12/1995, "Debating Options". 
08/12/1995, "Growth Rather than Welfare". 
22/12/1995, "Flawed Systems". 
29/03/1996, "Dangerous Liaisons". 
- ~ 
12/04/1996, "Deploying New Weapons to Combat Smuggling". 
17/05/1996, "Woolly Thinking?" . 
07106/1996, "The Party's Over" . 
.. 
26/06/1996, "SA Takes its Time Over Free Trade Mandate". 
19/07/1996, "Forging the Links". 
26/07/1996, "When all News is Bad News". 
02/08/1996, "Asian Tiger Leaps Ahead as a Major Investor". 
16/08/1996, State Opens the Arteries". 
15/09/1996, "Hazard Lights Flashing". 
71 
Weekly Mail and Guardian 
0911211994, "Opening Doors for Exports". 
24/0311995, "Tough Time Ahead for Textile Industry". 
15/0611995, "Manuel's Bloodless Coup". 
15/0711995, "Textiles Still in Need of Unraveling". 
0811211995, "Foreign Investment in SA is on the up and up". 
22/0311996, "Illegal Imports Tear the Fabric of Textile". 
12/0811996, "Tariff Cuts 'Good for Business"'. 
Finance Week 
14-20/0111993, "Fighting Talk". 
08-14/0711993, "Jobs Conflict". 
3-9/02/1994, "Paternal Help". 
28/0711994, "Share Boom all Around". 
27/1011995, "Route to the East". 
23-2911111995, "Selling SA". 
The Star 
0811011996, "Rags and Riches for Smugglers". 
Werk News Desk 
20/0811996, "Anti-Dumping Legislation" 
Africa News Service 
SADC Agrees to Remove Tariffs. 1996. www.elibrary.com 
72 
